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Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: A Policy Analysis Of The
Expropriation Cases
by Steven R. Swanson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent events surrounding the Iranian Revolution have provided
numerous issues of interest to the international lawyer. The hostage
crisis, the freezing of Iranian assets, and the aborted rescue mission have
all received a great deal of attention.' The seizure of the United States
Embassy in Tehran on November 3, 1979,2 effectively destroyed the
political and economic bonds that had developed between the two coun-
tries. Trade was cut off, contracts were breached, and the investments of
United States citizens were expropriated.3 In response, the President of
the United States ordered that all Iranian assets in the United States and
within the jurisdictional reach of the United States be frozen.4 Private
parties also took action to attach the assets of Iran in the United States.
It became clear that any solution to the hostage problem would have to
provide for the release of the hostages, the thawing of frozen assets, and a
remedy for parties allegedly injured by Iran.'
The solution was ultimately reached in the Algiers Accords on Jan-
uary 19, 1981. The Accords are made up of two declarations and various
technical arrangements.' The Declaration of the Government of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; A.B., Bowdoin College; J.D.,
Vanderbilt University School of Law; LL.M., Yale University School of Law; Associate, Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 1981-1983.
I See, eg., E. ABRAHAMIAN, IRAN BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS (1982); W. FORMS, FALL
OF THE PEACOCK THRONE: THE STORY OF IRAN (1980).
2 For more on the hostage crisis, see P. SALINGER, AMERICA HELD HOSTAGE (1981); S.
MOODY, 444 DAYS: THE AMERICAN HOSTAGE STORY (1981).
3 Stewart & Sherman, Developments at the Iran- United States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, 24
VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1983).
4 Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979). For analysis of United States actions
taken in response to the hostage seizure, see Gordon, The Blocking of Iranian Assets, 14 INT'L LAW.
659 (1980); Piper, Executive Power Under the Hostage Act; New Life for an Old Law, 14 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 369 (1981).
5 Stewart & Sherman, supra note 3, at 3.
6 1 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 3 (1981-82), 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981). These documents are: The
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the
Commitments Made by Iran and the United States, id. at 5, 20 I.L.M. at 224; Undertakings of the
Government of Iran and the United States, id. at 7, 20 I.L.M. at 229; The Declaration of the Gov-
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Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commit-
ments made by the Iran and the United States contained the heart of the
agreement. It provided for a United States agreement not to interfere in
the internal affairs of Iran,7 the cessation of litigation against Iran in the
United States,8 the suspension of the United States claim relating to the
hostage crisis before the International Court of Justice,9 and certain
measures that the United States would take to freeze the assets of the
Shah in the United States. 'o The agreement also stated that the parties
had determined to settle various disputes through arbitration."
The arbitration provisions were set out in the Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Con-
cerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran."2 The Declaration
established the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal was
empowered to decide:
claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of na-
tionals of Iran against the United States, and [any] counterclaim which
arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that consti-
tutes the subject matter of that national's claim, if such claims and
counterclaims are outstanding on the date of this Agreement, whether
or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts (including
transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or bank guaran-
tees), expropriations or other measures affecting property rights...
and excluding claims arising under a binding contract between the par-
ties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within
the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts, in response to the
Majlis position. 13
In addition, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes between the
United States and Iran concerning purchase and sale of goods contracts
and interpretation of the Declaration. 4
Decisions are to be made "on the basis of respect for law, applying
such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international
law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account rele-
vant usages of the trade, contract provisions and changed circum-
ernment of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by
Iran and the United States, id. at 9, 20 I.L.M. at 230; and the Escrow Agreement, id. at 12, 20
I.L.M. at 234.
7 20 I.L.M. at 224 (para. 1).
8 Id. at 227 (para. 11).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 227-28 (para. 12).
11 Id. at 228 (paras. 16, 17).
12 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. at 9, 20 I.L.M. at 230.
13 Id., 20 I.L.M. at 230-31 (art. II(1)).
14 Id. (art. 11(1), (2)).
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stances."' 5 The rules of the Tribunal are the arbitration rules of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
"except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the Tribunal to ensure
that this Agreement can be carried out.' 16 These rules, as modified by
the Tribunal, allow the Tribunal to decide cases ex aequo et bono if the
arbitrating parties agree that it should do so.' 7
The Tribunal is made up of nine members, three chosen by the
United States, three by Iran, and three chosen by the Iranian and United
States arbitrators. More arbitrators, in multiples of three, may be chosen
if it is deemed necessary by Iran and the United States. The Tribunal has
divided itself into three chambers, with three members each, to hear pri-
vate claims. The Tribunal meets at the Hague.' 8
The General Declaration also provided for a $1 billion security fund
to be created from Iran's assets in the United States. 9 These funds are to
be used to pay awards made by the Tribunal. Iran is required to main-
tain a minimum balance of $500 million in the account.20
The significance of this Tribunal's decisions on the development of
international law cannot be understated. In recent history no arbitral
tribunal has faced the enormous task now before the Tribunal.21 Over
15 Id. at 11, 20 I.L.M. at 232 (art. V).
16 Id. at 10, 20 I.L.M. at 231 (art. 111(2)).
17 Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, art. 33, reprinted in Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 6447
(April 1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure].
18 Things have not always gone smoothly for the Tribunal. On September 7, 1984, the New
York Times reported:
An Iranian judge threatened to kill a Swedish judge today at the international tribunal that
is handling claims arising from the Iranian takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran
in 1979, diplomats said.
The diplomats said the threat was made after the Iranian judge, Mahmoud M.
Kashani, refused to apologize for physically assaulting the Swede, Nils Mangard, on Mon-
day.
"If Mangard ever dares to enter the tribunal chamber again, either his corpse or my
corpse will leave it rolling down the stairs," Judge Kashani said today, according to diplo-
mats and tribunal officials.
Judge Kashani and another Iranian Judge Shafey Shafeiei were said to have grabbed
Judge Mangard by the collar, twisted his arm behind his back and begun [sic] beating him
up during Monday's session of the tribunal. Judge Mangard was not seriously hurt.
The tribunal president, Judge Gunnar Lagergren of Sweden, issued a letter today that
suspended all tribunal proceedings-six sessions due to begin Sept. 24-until further
notice.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1984, at A5, col. 2. Following this, proceedings were suspended on September
17, 1984. In December, the Tribunal once again began its work following the appointment of two
new Iranian arbitrators. Stewart, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. A Review of Develop-
ments 1983-1984, LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 677, 680 (1984).
19 1 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. at 5, 20 I.L.M. at 226 (paras. 5, 6).
20 Id. at 6, 20 I.L.M. at 226 (para. 7).
21 THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 1981-1983 viii (Lillich ed. 1984).
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3800 claims were filed, and over 200 decisions have been issued.22 In
terms of the sheer number of decisions, it will be difficult for interna-
tional legal scholars to ignore the jurisprudence of the Tribunal.
One area of international law that has continuously confounded
scholars is host state responsibility for injury to foreign investors. Be-
cause a number of measures, both formal and informal, taken by the Ira-
nian government affected the interests of United States investors, the
Tribunal is in an unusually good position to affect development of the
law in this area. Each of the Tribunal's three chambers has issued signifi-
cant decisions relating to the taking of foreign investments. One author
has argued that the importance of the decisions of the Tribunal is their
discussion of the amount of compensation required.23 Although the Tri-
bunal's discussion of this issue has provided interesting insights, its tak-
ing decisions are much more important for their discussion of what level
of host state interference amounts to a taking under contemporary stan-
dards of international law. There is little question that physical confisca-
tion of property amounts to a taking. What is less clear is whether a
taking occurs in other, often informal, acts affecting international invest-
ments. The natures of the Iranian Revolution and of the Tribunal itself
have afforded the Tribunal a perfect position to further the development
of international law in this area. This paper will examine what threshold
level of government interference should constitute a compensable taking
of a foreign investment in light of a preferred community policy. The
paper will then examine the decisions of the Tribunal in an attempt to
determine whether those decisions reflect a preferred community policy
and further provide some basis with which to predict the outcome of
future host state acts that effect foreign investments.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A TAKING?
Takings are difficult to define under international law. Traditional
scholars have attempted to define and distinguish different types of tak-
ing such as nationalization, expropriation, and confiscation. An expro-
priation has been defined as the state's taking "possession of personal,
individually held assets and rights of foreigners and usually mak[ing]
prompt and fair payment for them."' 24 In contrast, nationalizations are
22 Stewart, supra note 18, at 683.
23 Clagett, The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Is "Just
Compensation" Required by International Law or Not?, 16 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 813 (1984).
Given the availability of the $I billion fund out of which to pay judgments, it can be argued that the
Tribunal has not had to be as sympathetic to the developing nation's claims that something less than
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation is required. Its jurisprudence in this area may not be
as persuasive as it would otherwise be.
24 R. RIBIERO, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(1977); see, e.g., B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-41 (1959): G.
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seen as more general. The host state takes property in "the larger inter-
ests of society to advance a program of economic and social reforms" in
order to "have the ownership of wealth and natural resources, as well as
the means of production perform a social function."2 A confiscation has
been seen as "the deliberate seizure of property by a State, without provi-
sion for adequate compensation; it usually implies the denial of any right
to restitution or damages.",2 6 While these terms may be helpful in
describing various acts and intentions of the host state, they are not at all
helpful in determining which host state actions relating to property
should require an international remedy. The term "taking" includes all
of these concepts as well as other state actions affecting property and
provides a clearer basis for analysis. Recent attempts to clarify exactly
what level of state interference rises to the level of a taking have failed,
however, to provide a clear standard on which a taking determination
may be based.27
The underlying question is when does state action amount to mere
regulation by the host state, in which case no true "taking" has occurred,
and when does it constitute a compensable taking. A typical example of
the difficulties posed by this question can be found in the area of taxation.
The state's right to impose reasonable measures of taxation is unques-
tioned. But what about a tax of one hundred percent or more, which
deprives the investor completely of his investment? Other regulations
may also prove to be so onerous that the investment loses all value. Such
state regulation is often referred to as "creeping expropriation" because a
taking occurs without direct action to physically deprive the investor of
his property. In the one hundred percent tax example, it appears obvious
that a taking has occurred. When the regulation is less burdensome,
however, where should the line be drawn between the non-compensable
regulation and the compensable taking? There is currently no well-de-
fined international standard for making such a determination.28
WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 41 (1961); Domke, Foreign Nationalizations:
Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 588; S. FRIEDMAN, EX-
PROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953).
25 R. RIBIERO, supra note 24, at 1.
26 B. VORTLEY, supra note 24, at 39.
27 See, e.g., Weston, "Constructive Takings" Under International Law: A Modest Foray into the
Problem of "Creeping Expropriations", 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 102 (1975); Christie, What Constitutes a
Taking of Property Under International Law?", 1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1964).
28 A review of United States eminent domain practice establishes that international law is not
alone in its inability to come to grips with the taking problem. The Supreme Court has stated on
numerous occasions that there are no rigid rules. See, eg., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977); United States v. Caltex (Philippines) Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952);
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
One commentator has gone as far as to claim that the Supreme Court's decisions in the area are
"a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). The Supreme Court's approach to the taking problem finds its roots in the
1986]
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A. Current State of International Law
Two early international cases established that a taking may occur
when the state affects property in such a way as to render the property
rights worthless.29 This is true even when the state denies any intention
to take the property.3 ° Subsequent decisions by international tribunals
and state practice have failed, however, to establish an analytical frame-
work with which to make taking decisions. In an in-depth discussion of
international cases dealing with the taking problem, focusing particularly
on opinions of the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
Christie came to the following general conclusions:
(1) Although most interference with property . . . can be clothed
under the rubric of some recognized social purpose, the cases have
clearly indicated that a State's mere declaration that expropriation is
not intended is not determinative of the issue ....
(2) Almost any outright seizure of property if not initially an expropri-
ation, will eventually ripen into an expropriation ....
(3) There are certain types of State interference which, from the out-
set, will be considered as expropriation even though not labelled as
such . . . . This conclusion, as well as the previous one, is founded
upon the premise that the most fundamental right that an owner of
property has is the right to participate in its control and management.
(4) The refusal to give permission in advance for the transfer abroad of
operating profits, or other funds, does not by itself amount to expropri-
ation. When coupled with other interferences with the use of property,
opinions of Justices Harlan and Holmes. Id. at 37. Harlan based his interpretation on traditional
property concepts such as the appropriation of proprietary interests, physical invasion, and nuisance.
Id. This approach has reappeared on a regular basis in the Court's decisions. In a relatively recent
decision, the Court stated that a "taking may more readily be found when interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government .... " Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
Justice Holmes, on the other hand, found himself in a world of radical changes in which formal
legalisms seemed artificial and out of date. Sax, supra, at 37. He felt that each case should be
decided individually based on a policy analysis of the conflict between public need and private loss.
Id. Holmes saw the issue in terms of a social conflict between established economic interests and the
forces of social change, and he felt it was the courts' duty to serve as the fair and equal arbiter of the
controversy. Id. This approach can most clearly be seen in Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922). According to Holmes, the courts should consider the
extensiveness of the harm caused by the regulation in determining whether a taking has occurred.
Sax, supra, at 41.
The Supreme Court has never adopted Holmes' approach. In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1961), the Court stated that "although a comparison of values before and after is
relevant, it is by no means conclusive (citations omitted)." Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis has
been based upon a number of factors, placing greatest emphasis on traditional property values. Dim-
inution in value is considered in this analysis, but it is by no means a primary consideration.
29 Christie, supra note 27, at 311; German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926
P.C.I.J., set. A, No. 7; Norway v. United States, 1 Int'l Arb. Awards 307 (1952).
30 Christie, supra note 27, at 310.
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however, the refusal to permit transfer of funds abroad is a relevant
factor ....
(5) The refusal to permit the alienation of real property, or of personal
property. . . would seem, under some circumstances, to amount to an
expropriation for which . . . compensation is payable. If, however,
such prohibition can be justified as being reasonably necessary to the
performance by a State of its recognized obligations to protect the pub-
lic health, safety, morals or welfare, then it would normally seem that
there has been no "taking" of property.
(6) . . . [I]t is not at all clear that the prohibition of the sale of certain
items. . . or the grant of a monopoly may not amount to [expropria-
tion] ....
(7) A State's declaration that a particular interference with an alien's
enjoyment of his property is justified by the so-called "police power"
does not preclude an international tribunal from making an independ-
ent determination of this issue. But, if the reasons given are valid and
bear some plausible relationship to the action taken, no attempt may
be made to search deeper to see whether the State was activated by
some illicit motive.
(8) Where a State compels an alien to sell his property for less than its
true value either to the State or a third party, a compensable claim
31arises.
Christie concludes that the taking problem can best be addressed through
the common law method of case-by-case development. 32 Although his
article provides an excellent review of decisional authority, it fails to dis-
cuss the need for a policy-oriented analytical model to aid in the determi-
nation of what constitutes a taking.
Three relatively recent arbitrations provide additional insight into
the taking issue. In Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asi-
atic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic
(Caltex Case),33 sole arbitrator Professor Ren6-Jean Dupuy addressed
the issues created by the Libyan nationalization of Caltex's interests in an
oil concession agreement. The agreements contained stabilization provi-
sions, which prohibited Libya from taking any action in contravention of
the agreement. 34 The Caltex Case firmly rejects the arguments of the
developing nations that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States represents the present state of international law. 31 Professor Du-
puy's opinion indicates that nationalization questions are governed by
international law rather than the law of the host state.36
31 Id. at 337-38.
32 Id. at 338.
33 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
34 Id. at 4 (para. 3 of judgment).
35 Id. at 11-17 (paras. 22-45 ofjudgment). See U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
36 Id. at 29-32.
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The second major arbitration, Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. and
Overseas Private Investment Corp. , concerned a claim by Revere against
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) under a contract of
guaranty relating to an investment in a bauxite mining operation in Ja-
maica. Under the terms of the Contract of Guaranty, Revere submitted
an application for compensation to OPIC, claiming that the acts of the
Jamaican Government constituted expropriatory action.38 Under the
guaranty agreement, expropriatory action occurred when the investor
was prevented from "exercising effective control over the use or disposi-
tion of a substantial portion of its property . . . . 3 There was no ques-
tion in this case that Revere remained in possession of the plant; there
was no physical intervention on the part of the Jamaican Government.'
In determining whether effective control has been interfered with, the
Award saw the ability to make a continuous stream of decisions as con-
trolling.4 1 It focused on the decision-making process, finding that ra-
tional decisions require some continuity of management control.4 2 The
Tribunal rejected the claim that physical seizure is necessary.43 This no-
tion of expropriatory action is expansive in that any action on the part of
the host state that interferes with the power to effectively manage an
enterprise may be seen as expropriatory.
In sharp contrast to the view expressed in Revere, the decision of
Professor Reuter in The Government of the State of Kuwait and the
American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil)4 is far more favorable to
the claims of the wealth importing countries. In 1948, Aminoil was
granted a concession for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum
and natural gas by the ruler of Kuwait.45 On September 19, 1977, Ku-
wait enacted Decree Law No. 124, "Terminating the Agreement between
the Kuwait Government and Aminoil."46 The Tribunal recognized the
special needs of developing countries by acknowledging that changes in
the general legal environment may, in some cases, justify unilateral ac-
tion by one of the parties to the contract.4 7 Thus, Reuter concluded that
the "take-over" of the Aminoil Concession was not inconsistent with the
stabilization clauses, provided that it was not confiscatory in nature.48
37 17 I.L.M. 1321 (1978).
38 Id. at 1322.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1325-27.
41 Id. at 1350.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1329-30.
44 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982).
45 Id. at 989.
46 Id. at 998.
47 Id. at 1019.
48 Id. at 1023.
Vol. 18:307
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
He termed the taking a "lawful nationalization."'49 Because Kuwait spe-
cifically provided for compensation and willingly referred the matter to
arbitration, the nationalization was not confiscatory in this case."°
Reuter's approach, then, is much different than that adopted by Du-
puy in Caltex and Haight in Revere. While Dupuy and Haight reject, for
the most part, the claims of developing countries for greater control over
natural resources, Reuter recognizes that changed conditions may bring
about a change in the legal regime. As to what constitutes a compensa-
ble taking, Haight looks to the loss of effective control, defined as the
ability to make a continuous stream of decisions. Reuter would require
that the intrusion be much greater in order to reach the taking threshold.
According to Reuter, a taking must be confiscatory in nature, causing
serious financial prejudice to the investor.
B. Preferred Community Policy
In order to create an analytical framework for discussing the taking
problem, it is necessary to construct a policy-oriented test that meets the
goals of a preferred community policy for the advancement of human
dignity: "a world public order in which values are shaped and shared
more by persuasion than by coercion, and which seeks to promote the
greatest production and widest possible sharing, without discriminations
irrelevant of merit, of all values among all human beings."5"
49 Id. at 1025.
50 The minority opinion notes that all nationalizations are confiscatory because they dispossess
the investor of his property and transfer it elsewhere: "Nationalisation may be lawful or unlawful,
but the test can never be whether they are confiscatory or not; because by virtue of their inherent
character, they always are." Id. at 1051.
s M. McDOUGAL & Assoc., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 987 (1960).
Such values include not only security, in the sense of full opportunity, free from violence
and threats of violence, to pursue all values by peaceful, non-coercive procedures, but also
all the other value-variables upon which such security depends: the wide sharing of power,
both formal and effective, including participation in the processes of government and of
parties and pressure groups, and equality before the law; freedom of inquiry and opinion
and for communication of the enlightenment by which rational decisions can be made; the
access to resources and technology necessary to the production of goods and services for
maintenance of rising standards of living and comfort; the fundamental respect for human
dignity which both precludes discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, political
opinion, or other ground irrelevant to capacity and provides a positive recognition of com-
mon merit as a human being and special merit as an individual; health and well-being and
inviolability of the person, with freedom from cruel and inhuman punishments and positive
opportunity for the development of talents and enrichment of personality; opportunity for
the acquisition of the skill necessary to express talent and to achieve individual and com-
munity values to the fullest; opportunity for affection, fraternity, and congenial personal
relationships in groups freely chosen; and, finally, freedom to justify common standards of
responsibility and rectitude, to explain life, the universe, and values, and to worship God or
gods as may seem best.
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More specifically, Professor Weston has pointed out four important
objectives relevant to the taking problem:
(a) reducing the possibility for resort to coercion on the part of capi-
tal-exporting, claimant countries;
(b) maximizing the free flow of beneficial wealth, skills, enlightenment
and other important values across national boundaries;
(c) fostering at least minimum order within capital-importing, depriv-
ing countries; and
(d) facilitating an optimum return from all host-country value
processes.
52
In order to round out these objectives it is important to consider the
adequate exclusive competence of the host country.
Thus, a preferred community policy has three major goals. The first
is the discouragement of the use of force. Takings should be defined in a
way likely to reduce conflict. The definition should accordingly protect
the interests of powerful, capital-exporting countries to reduce the possi-
bility that they will feel compelled to take coercive actions. At the same
time, the rule should be sensitive to the needs of the host country so that
it does not feel compelled to use force. In addition, the definition should
provide a degree of certainty to avoid the disputes that often arise when
ambiguous rules are in place.
The second major goal is to maximize the likelihood of economic
development. Although there may be disputes about how economic de-
velopment should be achieved, there is substantial agreement that such a
goal is desirable. Lesser developed countries find themselves in need of
foreign investment from capital exporters in order to develop. Of course,
no influx of capital is possible unless the investor is adequately assured
that he will not be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Such assurances
can only be provided in a system in which compensable takings are
clearly defined. If the definition is ambiguous, the resulting uncertainty
is likely to dry up the flow of capital, and the goal of economic develop-
ment will not be achieved. These needs, as well as the goal of reducing
conflict, are clearly recognized in the Revere and Caltex opinions.
Finally, the sovereign nature of the host state must be recognized.
In a world system based, to a certain extent, on sovereignty, every state
must retain the right to adequately control events that take place within
its territory. In order to encourage development, each state must be able
to create its own political and economic system, while at the same time
preserve certain important host state values. No state would be willing
McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument
of Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915, 916-17 (1952).
52 Weston, supra note 27, at 122.
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to submit to a norm that deprives it of these rights. Professor Reuter
emphasized these values in the Aminoil Award.
It is difficult to formulate a standard that will encourage investment,
provide the host state with needed latitude, and decrease the resort to
force. Previously suggested taking standards have failed to properly bal-
ance these three goals in the attempt to formulate a norm that most
nearly comports with all three preferred community policy goals. A
proper balancing of these interests will provide a basis for the construc-
tion of such a standard.
In order to fully understand the taking problem, one must envision
the actions of the host state on a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is
state action that has little or no effect on the investment in question. At
the other end the investor is totally deprived of any value in his invest-
ment. Between these two extremes, state action partially lessens the
value of his investment. It is this range that is important in analyzing the
taking problem. The question then becomes at what point in the spec-
trum has the state so involved itself that compensation must be paid.
Revere and Aminoil suggest two possible solutions to this problem.
In adopting a standard that presumes the investor is able to make a con-
tinuous stream of decisions, Revere places the threshold near the "no
interference" end of the spectrum. The implications of such a choice are
troublesome; almost any action on the part of the host state government
that interferes with the investor's decision-making ability would be sus-
pect. Under such a standard, regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Federal Trade Commission would appear to consti-
tute expropriatory measures because they limit the ability of an investor
to make important business decisions. A failure to act to protect the
exclusive control of the investor might also be seen as an expropriation
under this standard. Even if this is taking the Revere argument too far,
the decision does seem to support these contentions.
The Revere standard does not comport with the preferred commu-
nity policy goals outlined above. Although it does lessen the likelihood
of coercion by wealth exporting countries and provides stability to en-
courage international investment, the standard divests the host state of
any right to meaningfully regulate the foreign investor. Even developed
nations, such as the United States with its myriad of governmental rules
and regulations, would find such a rule unacceptable.
At the other end of the spectrum, Aminoil required that the action
of the government be confiscatory to constitute a taking. Under this
holding, no unlawful expropriation occurs unless the host state takes
some action to deprive the investor of his property. Exactly what this
means is unclear from Professor Reuter's opinion, but it seems to require
state intervention in a manner similar to that suggested by adherents to
traditional legal concepts requiring some sort of physical invasion by the
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host state. Although his test provides for a great deal of host state com-
petence, it does little to decrease the likelihood of coercion or to en-
courage additional investment. The rule fails to protect the investor who
has been deprived of the value of his investment by some means other
than a confiscatory act.
Thus, neither approach provides a satisfactory standard on which to
make taking determinations. The Reuter opinion requires that the state
involvement be too close to the physical seizure end of the taking spec-
trum, while the Haight opinion finds a taking when government acts only
minimally interfere with an investment. A better approach is a substan-
tial diminution of value test: a taking will be found when the state affects
a foreign investment in such a way as to deprive the investor of substan-
tially all value in the investment. Diminution in value theories, which
compare the value of the investment prior to the government action with
the value afterwards, have been heavily criticized by the commentators. 3
Such tests are accused of failing to solve the taking problem because the
total destruction of property values is often allowed. 4 They are also crit-
icized because they provide a conservative influence by maintaining es-
tablished values." Finally, difficulties in quantifying the loss have been
pointed out. 6 Although these criticisms merit consideration, they fail to
deprive the substantial diminution in value test of its utility. The test,
while not providing an automatic standard for determining that a taking
has occurred, comes as close to an international minimum standard as is
possible. This approach is supported by the position of the American
Law Institute:
Section 192. Meaning of Taking
Conduct attributable to a state that is intended to, and does, effectively
deprive an alien of substantially all the benefit of his interest in prop-
erty constitutes a taking of the property, . . . even though the state
does not deprive him of his entire legal interest in the property.
"Comments"
a. General. International law has not established clear criteria for de-
termining what constitutes a taking of an alien's property, short of
complete transfer of title. The rule stated in this Section is intended to
cover only those situations in which conduct attributable to a state is
substantially equivalent to the taking of the alien's legal interest in the
property.57
53 See, e.g., Sax, supra note 28, at 50; Weston, supra note 27, at 119-20.
54 Sax, supra note 28, at 51.
55 Id. at 53.
56 Id. at 60; Weston, supra note 27, at 120.
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 192
(1965). A more recent draft of the Restatement omits this formulation of the taking standard. RE-
STATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (Tent. Draft No.
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This substantial diminution in value standard should serve to decrease
the use of force in solving investment/taking disputes. It can be applied
to any alleged taking situation and provides a certain amount of protec-
tion to wealth exporting countries. If the rule is applied uniformly, the
wealth exporting state will know that its investments are protected from
the worst kinds of expropriations, those in which the investor loses every-
thing. The substantial diminution in value standard should also mini-
mize disputes over lesser intrusions that would not violate this
international minimum standard.
Although the substantial diminution in value standard may not
meet all of the needs of the international investment community, it does
provide enough protection to assure that international investment will
continue. By protecting against state regulation that deprives an investor
of substantially all interest in his investment, the test assures that no in-
vestor will lose everything by investing in another nation. The host state
will act carefully knowing that such regulation will require compensa-
tion. Obviously the investor would prefer greater protection, but as a
minimum standard the substantial diminution in value test provides an
amount of certainty that is not present with the previously suggested
tests. It should be remembered that an investor may negotiate greater
guarantees with the host country itself, and these guarantees will gener-
ally be enforceable under international law. Additionally, the substantial
diminution in value test does not require a confiscatory act and thus pro-
vides greater protection to the investor than the test developed in Ami-
noil, which did require that the government act be confiscatory.
Finally, in contrast to the rule set out in Revere, the substantial dim-
inution in value standard provides a great deal of necessary flexibility to
the host country. The state may exercise control over the foreign inves-
tor as long as such regulation does not deprive the investor of substan-
tially all value in his investment. Of course, the host state may take the
entire investment, provided that it is willing to compensate the investor.
Flexibility is necessary if a host state is to organize its economy to en-
courage development. It also smacks less of economic colonialism than
3, 1982). Article 10(3) of the Harvard Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens seems to support the proposition:
3. (a) A "taking of property" includes not only an outright taking of property but
also any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as
to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the
property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.
(b) A "taking of the use of property" includes not only an outright taking of use
but also any unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of property for a limited
period of time.
SOHN & BAXTER, CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJU-
RIES TO ALIENS (Draft No. 12), art. 10, para. 3 (1961). See also Report of the Committee on Nation-
alization of Property, 1957-1958 INT'L L. INST. PROC. 63.
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have previous attempts to deal with the problem and should lessen the
perception of the host state that it is being oppressed by Western powers.
What about the criticisms of the rule? The quantification problem is
less problematic under the substantial diminution in value standard than
in many of the other suggested approaches. The problem of drawing a
line between a compensable taking and an exercise of police power is
eased if a taking occurs only when the investment has been deprived of
substantially all value. It should be far less difficult to reach an agree-
ment on when an investor has been deprived of substantially all value
than when there has been a lesser diminution, such as in Revere. Thus,
individual cases will be more easily analyzed. Admittedly, the rule set
out in Aminoil which requires that a taking be confiscatory would be
more easily applied. That rule, however, does not comport with other
preferred community policy goals. By failing to provide adequate protec-
tion to the foreign investor, the rule would serve to discourage foreign
investment and slow economic development. It seems that a certain
amount of uncertainty is inherent in any rule that attempts to comport
with these policy goals, but the substantially-all rule comes closest to
eliminating detrimental uncertainty.
Another criticism is that the standard is inappropriate because
courts frequently permit the total destruction of established legal values
without compensation. International courts and commentators have fo-
cused on whether a "right" has vested in determining whether a property
interest that can be taken exists.58 United States courts have used the
argument that no property interest was affected in order to avoid the
constitutional requirement that compensation be paid.59 Critics allege
that these cases establish that compensation is not required in all cases in
which established economic values are diminished.6° Although these
cases may establish that the taking clause of the Constitution of the
United States does not require that compensation be paid in all cases in
which established economic values are destroyed, this argument has little
merit in creating an international standard. It is necessary to protect all
established ecoinomic values that are deprived of substantially all value if
the goal is to encourage international development. Any other solution
fails to provide adequate assurances to the investment community that
exported wealth will be adequately protected. If the goal is to provide
adequate protection for foreign investments, the rule must include all
forms of investments, rather than the limited property rights that have
traditionally been protected.
58 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 764 (2d ed. 1970).
59 Sax, supra note 28, at 51; see, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499,
502 (1945).
60 Sax, supra note 28, at 51.
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Critics argue that this type of test is inherently conservative because
it discourages change. A host state will be unable to reform its economic
and political system if it is forced to pay all of those whose established
economic values it destroys. This is of particular concern to developing
countries, Which may currently lack sufficient capital resources to make
these payments. Unfortunately, this conservatism may be necessary in
the international investment field. What is sought is not political conser-
vatism but predictability. Without predictability, world trade and invest-
ment are slowed because investors are unwilling to take the risks
involved. Moreover, such a system does not call for a total halt to
change. A host state may "buy out" this conservative bias by paying
compensation. The state may also take whatever action it wishes as long
as it does not deprive the investor of substantially all value in his
investment.
Thus, the substantial diminution in value test seems to provide a
standard for takings that is relatively easy to apply and at the same time
in line with our preferred community policy goals.6 1
III. CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN RELATING To
THE IRANIAN EXPROPRIATION OF UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT
A. United States Claims
In its statements concerning claims of United States nationals
against Iran, the United States has continued to espouse its view that
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation must be paid when a tak-
ing has occurred. It considers this to be the minimum standard required
by international law.62 The Department of State has argued that an addi-
tional basis for its assertion that prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
sation is required can be found in the Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran.63
61 For an in depth discussion of the techniques of taking and an analysis of past trends of
decision, see Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 17, 18
(1978); Weston, supra note 27, at 103. Various methods, including seizure, forced sales, state regula-
tion, and ideological deprivation strategies, can be used to accomplish a taking. Each of these tech-
niques of taking, innocent enough if used properly, can ripen into a taking when the host state uses it
to deprive the alien of substantially all value in his investment. The taking standard outlined above
cuts across all of the different techniques that can be used by applying a single economic standard
that can be applied to all state actions affecting property. In this way the method used by the state to
achieve its goal becomes less important. What is important is the outcome. No matter what tech-
niques are used by the wealth depriving state, a taking will be found when the action deprives the
investor of substantially all value in his investment.
62 Memorandum of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State relating to the Application of
the Treaty of Amity to Expropriations in Iran, 129 CONG. REc. S16,055, S16,059 n. 42 (1983)[here-
inafter Legal Advisor's Memorandum].
63 Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
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Article IV(2) of the Treaty provides:
Property of nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party,
including an interest in property, shall receive the most constant pro-
tection and security within the territories of the other High Con-
tracting Party, in no case less than that required by international law.
Such property shall not be taken except for public purpose, nor shall it
be taken without the prompt payment of just compensation. Such
compensation shall be in an effectively realizable form and shall repre-
sent the full equivalent of the property taken; and adequate provision
shall have been made at or prior to the time of taking for the determi-
nation and payment thereof.
64
The Department of State has concluded that this language requires Iran
to pay prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, 65 which the United
States considers to be its fair market value, equivalent to the going con-
cern value.66
Iran has stated that the Treaty was implicitly terminated by certain
actions taken by the United States. The United States position has been
that the Treaty remains in force, that any actions taken by the United
States in apparent contravention of the Treaty were taken justifiably in
response to illegal actions on the part of Iran, and that neither Iran nor
the United States has provided written notice of termination as required
by the Treaty.67 In addition, the United States has pointed to the Inter-
national Court of Justice opinion in Case Concerning United States Diplo-
matic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran).68 The Court stated
that the provisions of the Treaty "remained part of the corpus of law





The position of Iran has been less easy to discern. The pleadings
before the Tribunal concerning private claims are kept secret, making it
difficult to determine exactly what Iran's approach to the expropriation
problem has been. One thing is clear: the Iranians have taken inconsis-
tent stances on whether the Treaty of Amity continues in force. Before
64 Id. at 903 (art. IV(2)).
65 Legal Advisor's Memorandum, supra note 62, at S16,056.
66 Id. at S16,057. As to the date for determining the amount of compensation, the Department
of State has argued that "expropriated property must be valued as of the date of expropriation
disregarding the effects of any actions attributable to the expropriating government (1) that were
unlawful or (2) that were taken in anticipation of the expropriation." Id. Although there is no
specific provision in the treaty pertaining to this issue, the United States has argued that this inter-
pretation is "inherent in the principle of just compensation," and part of customary international
law. Id.
67 Id.
68 1980 I.C.J. 3.
69 Id. at 28.
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the Tribunal, they have claimed that the Treaty has lapsed, while citing it
as still being in force in litigation in the United States.7"
A review of the recent drastic changes in the perspectives of Iranian
ruling elites is helpful in understanding the Iranian position. The Shah,
like his father, made great headway in the area of socioeconomic pro-
gress. As one observer noted, "[b]y 1960, he had established his author-
ity, and emerged as the nonreligious, even antireligious, managing
director of the Empire of Iran, orchestrating the country's modernization
in day-to-day charge."71 He was impressed with Western ways in the
areas of science, technology and especially military weaponry.72 By the
mid-1970s he seemed to have created a secure position for himself with a
modern army, an effective secret police, huge bureaucracy, and massive
income.73 But the Shah had failed to control the growing discontent that
was brewing in Iran. By 1977 the movements that were to bring about
his downfall were in full swing.
The opposition that eventually destroyed the Shah centered around
Iran's conservative Moslem clergy. A basic tenet of Islamic faith is that
religion and government are one. Religious doctrine is the law. The
seemingly secular reign of the Shah was not compatible with the views of
the mullahs and ayatollahs of Iran. One ayatollah of particular impor-
tance was Ruhollah Khomeini. His attacks centered on the Shah's at-
tempts to modernize Iran. He viewed alcohol and gambling as evil.74
His vision of the state brought about the Revolution and now controls
Iran. The change in perspectives was striking. Article 2 of the new Con-
stitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran points out some of these differ-
ences:
The Islamic Republic is a system of government based on belief
in:
a. the One God (as stated in the Islamic creed "there is no god
but God"), His exclusive possession of sovereignty and the right to
legislate, and the necessity of submission to His commands;
b. divine revelation and its fundamental role of expounding of
laws;
c. the return to God in the hereafter, and the constructive role
of this belief in man's ascending progress toward God;
d. the justice of God in creation and legislation;
e. continuous leadership and guidance and its fundamental role
in assuring the continuity of the revolution of Islam;
70 See sources cited in Legal Advisor's Memorandum, supra note 62, at S16,057 n.6.
71 W. FORBIS, supra note 1, at 64.
72 Id. at 65.
73 E. ABRAHAMIAN, supra note 1, at 439-42.
74 V. FORBIS, supra note 1, at 142.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
f. the exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom, joined
to responsibilities before God . ...
The extreme dislike of foreign influence can also be seen in the new
constitution. Chapter I, article 3 provides for the "complete expulsion of
imperialism and the prevention of foreign influence,"'76 and chapter X
outlines the basis for Iranian foreign policy:
Article 152
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the
rejection of all forms of domination, the preservation of the complete
independence and territorial integrity of the country, the defense of the
right of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonist
superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with
all non-belligerant states.
Article 153
Any form of agreement resulting in foreign domination over the natu-
ral resources, economy, army or culture of the country, as well as
other aspects of the national life, is forbidden.77
Chapter IV of the Iranian Constitution divides the Iranian economy into
three sectors: state, cooperative, and private. The state sector includes
"all large-scale and major industries, foreign trade, major mineral re-
sources, banking, insurance, energy, dams and large-scale irrigation net-
works, radio and television, post telegraphic and telephone services,
aviation, shipping, roads, railroads, and the like. .... ,7' The coopera-
tive sector is to deal with companies involved in the production and dis-
tribution of goods. 79 Finally, left for the private sector are agriculture,
industry, trade, and "services that supplement the economic activities of
the other two sectors."8 Article 81 of chapter VI provides that "[t]he
granting of concessions to foreigners for the formation of companies or
institutions for commercial, industrial, and agricultural purposes, or for
the extraction of minerals, is absolutely forbidden."" t
Indeed, the Iranian government did not hesitate to begin making
changes in the economic system. A State Department Memorandum
outlines the United States' view of these Iranian actions:
During the spring of 1979, the Government of Iran announced its
intention to nationalize firms which were poorly managed or unprofita-
ble, or whose owners had left Iran. In June of that year, Iran national-
75 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONST. (H. Algar trans. 1980).
76 Id. ch. I, art. 3.
77 Id. ch. V, art. 152.
78 Id. ch. IV.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. art. 81. Article 82 provides that the "employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except
in cases of necessity and with the approval of the National Consultative Assembly." Id. art. 82.
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ized all banks and insurance companies. In July, Iran enacted the Law
for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industry, which nation-
alized additional industries, the share-holdings of certain individuals,
and all firms whose debts to the banks exceeded their assets. Addi-
tional firms were nationalized by the Act Concerning the Appointment
of a Temporary Director or Directors for the Custody of Production
and Industrial and Commercial and Agricultural and Service Units
whether in the Public or Private Sector, enacted June 16, 1979, and by
the Act Concerning the Management and Ownership of the Shares of
Contracting and Consulting Companies and Firms, enacted March 3,
1980. By February of 1981, according to the Minister of Industries
and Mines, some 580 companies had been nationalized since the
revolution. (citations omitted.)82
These formal acts, as well as other informal measures, have been the fo-
cus of the Tribunal as it tries to determine whether United States invest-
ments have been taken in violation of international law.
Thus the perspective of Iranian elites changed dramatically with the
Revolution. A deeply engrained distrust of foreign influence replaced a
general espousal of Western ways. An extremely conservative group of
clerics replaced a regime which, while not atheistic, challenged the tradi-
tions of Moslem clerics.
The Iranians appear to be espousing the views of the countries pro-
posing a New International Economic Order. In at least one case, Iran
has argued that it has a right to nationalize foreign investments as an
expression of its permanent sovereignty over natural resources and eco-
nomic activities.83 Although a duty to compensate may exist, there is no
requirement that such compensation be paid promptly, as long as the
expropriating nation indicates that compensation will be paid within a
reasonable time. The Iranians argue that there is no international re-
quirement that the full value of the property be paid. Partial compensa-
tion is appropriate, "based on resolutions of the United Nations organs
and. . . post-war settlement practice."84 Although espousing the views
of the developing nations, the Iranian arguments do not seem to contain
the radical anti-imperialist element that might be expected considering
the historical relationship between Iran and the United States and the
nature of the Iranian Revolution.
IV. TRIBUNAL DECISIONS RELATING To TAKINGS
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has addressed the question of what
constitutes the threshold level of government interference leading to a
82 Legal Advisor's Memorandum, supra note 62, at S16,054 n.18.
83 See American Int'l Group, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Assets Litigation Rep.
7744, 7747 (Jan. 13, 1984).
84 Id.
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finding that a taking has occurred. In doing this, each of the Tribunal's
three chambers has developed its own approach to the taking problem.
Each emphasizes different values and goals. None of the chambers has,
however, created and applied a standard that is completely supported by
preferred community policy goals. A close look at these decisions shows
this failure and at the same time provides a basis on which to predict the
outcomes of similar cases in the future.
A. Chamber Two Decisions
The development of the first strain of thought began in ITT Indus-
tries, Inc. and the Islamic Republic of Iran, for which United States Arbi-
trator George Aldrich wrote an opinion concurring in the Tribunal's
Award on Agreed Terms." Aldrich's opinion was based on his belief
that "the settlement may well have been inspired, at least in part, by
[Iran's] desire to prevent these views from appearing in the Award."86
The case involved the claim of ITT, the one hundred percent owner of
IKO Sweden, a Swedish corporation that held a twenty-five percent in-
terest in IKO Iran, an Iranian joint stock company.87 On December 22,
1980, Iran appointed four members to the Board of Directors of IKO
Iran, and shortly thereafter appointed the final member, removing the
five directors elected by the shareholders, including the director chosen
by the claimant.88
Prior to the settlement of the claim, ITT had argued that this as-
sumption of control over IKO Iran constituted a taking of its interest
85 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 6652 (June 3, 1983).
86 Id. Under the rules of the Tribunal, all settlements must be approved by the Tribunal. Final
Rules of Tribunal Procedure, supra note 17, art. 34.
87 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. at 6652. IKO Sweden was no stranger to government actions
affecting its interest in IKO Iran. It had originally owned 40% of IKO Iran, but laws requiring the
sale of shares to the government and the public decreased this to the 1980 level. Id.
88 Id. The appointments were made pursuant to the Legal Bill Concerning the Appointment of
Provisional Director or Directors for Supervising Production, Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural
and Service Units Whether in Public or Private Sector and the Protection and Development of
Iranian Industries Act. Id. Aldrich described this legislation:
Article 2 of the Bill provides that, upon appointment of directors, "... the earlier direc-
tors and persons in charge will be stripped of their competence . . ." and that
"[s]hareholders are not allowed in any way to appoint directors in their stead." Article 3,
which defines the management powers of government-appointed directors, states: "The
carrying out of affairs beyond the normal and current affairs of the unit shall be contingent
upon the approval of the relevant ministry, government institution or company." Article 5
requires the submission of reports by the directors to the relevant ministries, and its main-
tenance of employment purposes is succinctly expressed in Article 6 as follows: "During
the period in which the units mentioned in Article 1 are subject to the provisions of the




and that prompt, adequate, and effective compensation was required. 9
Iran, on the other hand, contended that its assumption of control may be
only temporary and accordingly does not constitute a compensable tak-
ing.90 In support of this view, Iran noted that a Supplemental Decree to
the Act for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industries had
created a five-member committee to determine the ultimate ownership of
companies under government supervision. 91 Aldrich determined that
IKO Sweden had been deprived of its right to participate in the manage-
ment and to receive information on the financial affairs of IKO Iran.92
He noted that government officials in control of the business owed no
fiduciary duty to the shareholders and were indeed managing the indus-
try for purposes contrary to the interests of the shareholders.93 Aldrich
stated his views of the appropriate standard for a finding of a taking:
[w]hile assumption of control over property by a government does not
automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property
has been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation under
international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever events
demonstrate that the owner was deprived offundamental rights of own-
ership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral. The
intent of the government is less important than the effects of the meas-
ures on the owner, and the form of control or interference is less im-
portant than the reality of their impact. (emphasis added.)94
The facts of the case, i.e., that ITT had received no profits or infor-
mation about the financial situation of IKO Iran, that the shareholders
had been denied the right to attend shareholders meetings, vote for direc-
tors, or act in any way to control the company, that Iran had failed to
take steps to review the ownership of IKO Iran, and that ITT will never
receive any profits earned during the period of government control or
compensation for any diminution in value during the period, led Aldrich
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. The Decree also provided: "In the event that the concern, upon the issuance of a final
ruling, is put at the disposal of the shareholders, the shareholders shall have no claims whatsoever in




93 Id. The opinion lists the following purposes:
(a) To observe the Islamic system in respect of labor rights.
(b) To disembark the economy of Iran from its affiliation to oil and to obtain indepen-
dence through local production up to self-sufficiency and to expand exports.
(c) To expand work field, employment and specialization.
(d) To stop agents of dictatorial and exploitative system.
(e) To avoid government patronage, to encourage and protect non-government activi-
ties and initiative of the private sector.
94 Id. at 6654.
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to conclude that Iran "has. . .rendered IKO Sweden's right of owner-
ship so meaningless as to be the equivalent of an expropriation of those
rights." 95
In another Chamber Two decision, Tippets, Abbot, McCarthy, Strat-
ten and TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers,96 the main parties involved
in the dispute before the Tribunal were: Tippets, Abbot, McCarthy,
Stratten (TAMS), a United States engineering and architectural consult-
ing firm; Aziz Farmanfarmaian and Associates (AFFA), an Iranian engi-
neering firm; TAMS-AFFA, an Iranian entity created by AFFA and
TAMS to coordinate efforts in providing consulting services for the con-
struction of the Tehran International Airport (TIA); and the Iranian
Civil Aviation Organization (CAO).97 On March 19, 1975, CAO,
TAMS, and AFFA signed a contract providing that TAMS and AFFA
would perform engineering and architectural consulting services relating
to the construction of TIA.9 s Shortly thereafter in August 1975, TAMS
and AFFA formed TAMS-AFFA, a partnership in which each held
equal shares to coordinate efforts in providing these consulting services.9 9
95 Id. at 6655. Interestingly enough, ITT appears to have argued that a taking had occurred
prior to Iran's formal appointment of new directors. Unfortunately, Aldrich fails to detail these
claims or the facts supporting them, making it difficult to determine whether a taking might have
occurred prior to this formal action. ITT argued that the valuation should be made as of a date prior
to the Revolution. Id. at 6657. In this case, ITT sought full par value for 172,500 shares plus
interest. Id. Iran argued that this valuation would be far too high because of a decline in the equity
value of IKO's stock beginning with the first forced sale. Id. Aldrich rejected the idea that acts prior
to or during the Revolution could form the basis for a claim:
That Iran might experience revolution was a risk assumed by investors in Iran, as in
any country, and any reduction in value of investments as a result of revolution cannot be
ignored by the Tribunal. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was not a "wrong" for which
foreign investors are entitled to compensation under international law.
Id. In determining the amount of compensation due, Aldrich felt that only the real value at the
moment of the taking should be considered. Id. Only the acts of the government itself should be
taken into account in determining whether this amount should be adjusted for a decline in value. Id.
Aldrich concluded that this real value declined to 75% of par value from the time of the 1978 forced
sale to the date of the taking. Id. at 6658. On the appropriate measure of compensation, Aldrich
found that the Treaty of Amity remained in force, and that both the Treaty and international law
require "the prompt payment of just compensation which is effective and adequate to compensate
fully for the value of the property taken." Id. at 6656. He based this conclusion on the holding of
the International Court of Justice that the Treaty of Amity remained in force in 1980 in Case Con-
cerning United States Diplomatic And Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran). Id. He also
relied on the failure of either party to give notice of termination as provided for in art. XXIII of the
Treaty. Id. The measure of compensation should be the value of the company as a "going concern"
at the time of the taking. Id. Aldrich noted that " 'going concern' has been defined to mean 'the
undertaking itself considered as an organic totality. . . the value of which is greater than that of its
component parts . . . .' [citation omitted]." Id. at 6656 n.4.
96 No. 141-7-2, slip op. (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. June 29, 1984).
97 Id. at 2.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 8.
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TAMS-AFFA decisions could only be made with the approval of a rep-
resentative from each partner.100
Everything went smoothly until late December 1978 when the dis-
turbances caused by the Iranian Revolution brought the airport project
to a halt. 1 ' On July 24, 1979, Iran appointed a temporary manager for
AFFA, the Farmanfarmaian family being one of the fifty-one families
whose businesses were taken over pursuant to the Law for the Protection
and Development of Iranian Industry. 10 2 There was some confusion
over whether the manager was to control only AFFA or TAMS-AFFA
as well: the Official Gazette listed the temporary manager as the TAMS-
AFFA manager, and he proceeded to take control of TAMS-AFFA. 103
The TAMS representative in Iran managed to partially straighten things
out in the fall of 1979, and the approval of the United States partner was
once again necessary for the expenditure of funds."° The Iranian man-
ager even assisted in obtaining payment of 34 million rials owed to
TAMS and then exporting the funds to the United States. 0 5 The crisis
in United States-Iran relations beginning in November 1979 brought an
end to this cooperation.10 6 TAMS's representative left Iran, and
TAMS's efforts to contact the manager by mail or telex were fruitless.107
Although continuing to function, TAMS-AFFA made no attempt to
contact TAMS regarding the progress of the project after December
1979.108 TAMS-AFFA continued to operate under Iranian-appointed
managers until the date of the decision. 0 9
TAMS argued that Iran had expropriated TAMS's fifty percent in-




103 Id. at 8-9.





109 Id. at 9-10.
110 Id. at 2. TAMS claimed that certain funds were owed under the original TIA contract. Id.
TAMS argued that in the event the Tribunal decided it lacked jurisdiction over the debts, accounts
receivable from CAO should be included in determining the amount of compensation payable due to
the expropriation. Id. TAMS's third claim related to a deposit at Bank Melli that TAMS alleged
had been unlawfully retained. Id. at 2-3. The fourth claim was an attempt to cancel bank guaran-
tees relating to the TIA project. Id. at 3. Respondents denied that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to
hear the claims or that an expropriation had occurred. Id. CAO counterclaimed that TAMS's
performance under the contract had been inadequate. Id. TAMS-AFFA counterclaimed that debts
for which TAMS was responsible were owed to third parties. Id. The two respondent banks coun-
terclaimed for maintenance charges on the bank guarantees. Id. Before considering the merits, the
Tribunal considered a number of jurisdictional issues. Id. The Tribunal concluded that it lacked
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made a general statement of the taking standard:
A deprivation or taking of property may occur under interna-
tional law through interference by a state in the use of that property or
with the enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the property
is not affected.
While assumption of control over property by a government does
not automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the prop-
erty has been taken by the government, thus requiring compensation
under international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever
events demonstrate that the owner was deprived offundamental rights
of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not merely ephem-
eral. The intent of the government is less important than the effects of
the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of controls or
interference is less important than the reality of their impact. I
Applying that standard to this case, the Tribunal found that the appoint-
ment of the AFFA manager did not amount to an expropriation.' 1 2
TAMS and the temporary manager were able to run the business to-
gether in mid-1979.13 The Tribunal recognized, however, that later de-
velopments in 1979 and 1980, including the failure to answer letters and
telexes from TAMS did amount to a taking."t4 Thus, the Tribunal was
faced with a choice between a formal act and later informal actions of the
government representative as the basis for its finding that an expropria-
tion had occurred. Unlike other decisions of the Tribunal, this one chose
the less formal acts as the basis for the decision, better reflecting the real-
ity of the impact on the investor. 1 5
jurisdiction to consider TAMS's contract claim because of the forum selection clause in the contract,
which deferred to Iranian courts. Id. at 4-5. The claims and the counterclaims relating to the bank
guarantees were also dismissed because of a lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 5-6. The Tribunal felt that the
guarantees were entered into pursuant to the contract and that the forum selection clause controlled
the obligations incurred thereunder. Id. at 6. Pointing to Harza and the fact that TAMS had made
no demand for the funds in its account, the Tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide TAMS'
claim relating to its bank deposits. Id. at 7. Finally, the Tribunal found that TAMS-AFFA lacked
standing to pursue counterclaims against TAMS relating to amounts owed to Iranian social security
and tax authorities. Id. These were debts owed by TAMS to the authorities, and only those authori-
ties had standing to pursue them. Id.
III Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
112 Id.
113 Id.
"14 Id. at 11-12.
115 Having determined that an expropriation of TAMS-AFFA had occurred, the Tribunal had
to determine the entity's value. In doing this, the Tribunal felt that it had to include "not merely
• . . bank accounts and fixed assets, but also the valuation of TAMS-AFFA's accounts receivable,
including those under the TIA contract and TAMS-AFFA's debts .... " Id. at 12. The Tribunal
recognized that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties under the TIA contract,
but felt that it could not ignore the accounts receivable in determining the value of TAMS-AFFA.
Id. at 14.
Dr. Shafei Shafeiei refused to sign the award. Id. at 19. He was disturbed by the majority's
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In dissent, Iranian Arbitrator Dr. Shafeiei asserted that Iran's ap-
pointment of a temporary manager was a benevolent act necessitated by
difficult circumstances:
In actuality, the collapse of the former regime destroyed a social,
political, economic and military order. The establishment of a new
order appeared difficult. Moreover, certain directors of enterprises,
many of which were heavily indebted to Iranian banking institutions,
fled Iran at its moment of crisis. It was the task of the newly-installed
government to avoid social disorganization, maintain order, and pre-
vent economic activity from coming to a halt. It was in this context
that the Bill of 19 June 1979 was voted into force by the Revolutionary
Council, whereby the Iranian Government was authorized to appoint
provisional managers for enterprises abandoned by their directors,
whether these latter had ceased to work or had for some reason or
another found it impossible to manage the day-to-day affairs of the
enterprise.
I believe that this appointment was made in the sole interest of all
those involved with AFFA, of which the sudden disappearance of the
directors would otherwise have disrupted the company's operations." 16
Dr. Shafeiei's reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it fails to
recognize that in many cases the new government was the cause of the
disruption. Directors were leaving the country because they feared for
their lives under the new "Islamic justice." Second, the dissent's descrip-
tion of the purpose of the temporary manager does not describe what
happened in this case. Certainly a government may step in to prevent
economic disaster during a period of disorder without violating interna-
tional law, but here it was not the appointment of a new manager that
the Tribunal found to be a taking. On the contrary, it was the manager's
later unwillingness to even communicate with one of the rightful owners
concerning the completion of the project that provided the basis for the
decision. Thus, the dissent's major objection to the Tribunal's decision is
without merit.
approach to the TIA accounts receivable. See id at 20. He argued that the Tribunal had failed to
recognize that these accounts were owing to TAMS under the TIA contract, rather than to TAMS-
AFFA. See id. at 28-36. TAMS-AFFA served only as a liason or agent between TAMS and AFFA
on the one hand and CAO on the other. Id. at 35. Thus, the accounts receivable should not have
been considered in determining the value of TAMS-AFFA. Id. at 36.
As pointed out by the majority, this argument lacks merit:
That the accounts receivable are those of TAMS-AFFA, rather than those of the indi-
vidual partners, seems clear from the conduct of the parties to the contract. The invoices
were submitted to the CAO to TAMS-AFFA, and payments were made by the CAO to
TAMS-AFFA. Division of revenues between the partners was effected from time to time
on the basis of decisions of TAMS-AFFA.
Id. at 13.
116 Id. at 30-31.
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These two decisions provided the basis for Chamber Two's taking
jurisprudence. In both cases a taking was found to have occurred when
the investor is "deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it ap-
pears that the deprivation is not merely ephemeral." '117 The key to under-
standing this standard is to determine what constitutes a fundamental
right of ownership. Is Chamber Two looking to the continuous stream of
decisions end of the spectrum suggested in Revere? Or is a fundamental
right at the other end of the spectrum, requiring some sort of physical
confiscation? It seems that in speaking of fundamental rights of owner-
ship, Chamber Two is positioning itself on the Revere end of the spec-
trum. The decisions do not speak of deprivation of all value in the
investments or of rendering the investment useless. Something less is re-
quired; although exactly what is left unclear. Deprivation of a funda-
mental right of property ownership can mean much less than is required
by the substantial diminution of value test. If property rights are consid-
ered to be a bundle of rights, it is possible that such an approach could
require a taking determination in cases in which only one of those rights
has been destroyed or otherwise affected. This may have serious conse-
quences when considered in light of preferred community policy goals.
The standard suggested by Chamber Two would not provide the
host state with adequate competence to control its economy in order to
encourage development. Although investors will be pleased with the
standard because of the additional protection provided, the standard is
not likely to lessen the resort to coercive measures. Host states will feel
the need to control internal matters despite the standard, leading to con-
flict between wealth importing and exporting countries.
Chamber Two rejects an intent requirement, arguing that the effect
on the investor is more important than whether the host state has delib-
erately set out to deprive a wealth exporter of his investment. This
stance is supported by preferred community policy goals. An intent ele-
ment is not necessary to further these goals. Indeed, an intent element
would run counter to the goal of encouraging development. An investor
will not feel protected if he knows that incidental effects of government
actions depriving him of all value in his investment will not be remedied.
The other positive element found in Chamber Two's jurisprudence
is the rejection of formalism. In the TAMS case, Chamber Two was will-
ing to look beyond the formal acts of the host state and base its taking
determination on other, informal measures affecting property rights.
This evidences a willingness to look to the reality of the situation as op-
posed to basing decisions only on the decrees of the host state. As previ-
ously discussed, any standard must look realistically at the impact on the
117 ITT, Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. at 6654 (opinion of Aldrich, Arb.). See TAMS-AFFA,
No. 141-7-2, slip op. at 10-11.
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investor in order to comply with preferred community policy goals.
Thus, although in minor ways supported by preferred community policy
goals, the basic formulation of Chamber Two's taking standard does not
adequately reflect these goals.
In two less important decisions, Chamber Two found that no taking
had occurred. Golpira v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran 1I8 dealt with a situation in which the claimant argued that his inter-
est in the Borzooyeh Medical Group had been taken by the Oppressed
People's Foundation's expropriation of the shares of the principle stock-
holder in the organization." 9 Golpira, the claimant, contended that Dr.
Bahadori, the principle stockholder, had held fifty percent of the stock
prior to that stock's expropriation by the Oppressed People's Founda-
tion. 2° Golpira alleged that the expropriation of these shares amounted
to an expropriation of his interest even though Iran did not appoint man-
agers or directors of the company.' The claimant argued that this ex-
propriation of Bahadori's shares, when added to a failure to pay
dividends, provide annual reports, or correspond in some way with the
claimant, amounted to a "de facto" expropriation of the interests held by
all of the remaining stockholders. 122
Iran contended that the Foundation held only 27.16 percent of the
2500 shares outstanding, while the remaining shares were in private
hands. 123 Golpira had received no dividends because the Medical Group
had simply failed to show a profit since Dr. Khansi, the representative of
the Foundation, had become the new managing director of the Medical
Group.'24 In addition, the Iranians argued that notices of shareholder
meetings had been published in local daily newspapers as required by
Iranian law.' 25
Chamber Two found that the claimant had failed to prove that his
ownership interest in the Medical Group had been expropriated. 126 The
Tribunal felt that, although it had been established that the management
118 2 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 171 (1983).
119 Id. at 175. The Iranians maintained that Golpira lacked standing to bring the claim before
the Tribunal because of the claimant's status as a dual Iran-United States national. Id. at 172. The
Tribunal found that although a dual national, Golpira had the right to bring the claim because his
"dominant and effective nationality at all relevant times has been that of the United States, and the
damages sought in the present claim are related primarily to his American nationality, not his Ira-
nian nationality." Id. at 174-75. The Iranian Arbitrator Dr. Shafeiei refused to join in the opinion
and penned a separate opinion on the issue of dual nationality. Id. at 177.
120 Id. at 173.




125 Id. at 176.
126 Id. at 175.
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of the Group had changed hands due to the nationalization of Dr.
Bahadori's stock, the claimant had failed to show that this action had
any effect on his ownership interest. 2 7 Golpira remained on the list of
stockholders, and he failed to receive dividends because dividends had
not been paid to anyone due to a lack of profits. 2 8 In the event of future
profits, Golpira remained eligible to receive dividends.'2 9 Although rec-
ognizing "that a taking of property may occur by virtue of unreasonable
interference in the use of that property," 130 the Tribunal found that the
record failed to establish that the control over the activities of the group
exercised by the Foundation was any different from that previously exer-
cised by Dr. Bahadori.13 '
In Harza Engineering Co. and the Islamic Republic of Iran,132 the
claimant alleged the expropriation of the contents of two bank accounts
in Iran at Bank Melli Iran and Bank Tejarat. 133 In 1979, after having
been forced to leave Iran, Harza made four attempts to draw on the ac-
counts in order to satisfy obligations that had been incurred in Iran.
34
In each case, Bank Melli refused to honor the drafts because of an alleged
failure to provide the authorized signature. 35 Having tried to obtain the
release of its funds for over a year, Harza ceased its efforts, concluding
that the funds had been expropriated by "direct and repeated interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment in violation of the Treaty of Amity...
and principles of international law."'1 36 Harza alleged that these actions
were taken pursuant to "a general government policy to block its bank
127 Id.
128 Id. at 176.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 177. In support of this proposition, the Tribunal cited Harza. Id.
131 Id. at 176.
132 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 5952 (Jan. 21, 1983).
133 Id. Harza was an United States engineering consulting firm, which provided services to the
Iranian Ministry of Energy in an effort to develop electrical power resources in that country. Id. at
5953. The accounts were opened to collect fees and pay expenses incurred in the provision of these
services. Id.
134 Id. at 5953.
135 Id. The first check was written to the Iranian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance
and signed by the Secretary-Treasurer of Harza. Id. Bank Melli refused to honor the check, claim-
ing that the Secretary-Treasurer's signature was not on file. Id. One month later, the official liquida-
tor of Harza wrote a replacement check. Id. This too was rejected on the same grounds. Id. In
December the liquidator sent Harza's Iranian counsel official verification of his appointment as liqui-
dator along with a third check, both of which counsel was to forward to Bank Melli. Id. Both this
check and a fourth were dishonored on the same grounds as the earlier checks had been rejected. Id.
At this point, on the advice of counsel and under the precise instructions of Bank Melli, Harza
executed formal signature cards which were witnessed by Harza's bank in the United States.
Id. Although Harza complied with Bank Melli's instructions, the bank informed Harza that a supple-
mental verification of the signature would have to be obtained from an Iranian consulate. Id. Harza
did not seek to provide the verification. Id.
136 Id. at 5953-54.
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accounts, and perhaps those of American companies in general
.... ,,137 As a measure of damages, Harza sought the balance of the
two accounts plus interest from the date of the first check. 138
Bank Melli contended, however, that it now accepts the liquidator's
signature, but that Harza had not attempted to draw on the account
since the signature was found to be authentic. 139 The bank further ar-
gued that its refusal to honor the checks was lawful because the signa-
tures did not match the most recent signature cards on file. 4 ° It also
stated that the refusal to honor the checks did not amount to an
expropriation. 141
In deciding that no unlawful expropriation had occurred, the Tribu-
nal noted that in ordinary circumstances the wrongful failure to honor a
draft constitutes a contract breach rather than an expropriation with
damages calculated according to the damages caused by the dishonor.'42
Here Harza was alleging a course of conduct that amounted to some-
thing more than a wrongful refusal to honor a check."' Although the
Tribunal recognized that an unreasonable interference with property can
amount to an expropriation under international law, 1" it looked to the
facts and determined that Bank Melli's actions had not unreasonably in-
terfered with Harza's use and enjoyment of the funds.'4 5
These two cases add little to the development of Chamber Two's
taking jurisprudence. An argument can be made that Golpira evidences a
retreat to formalism. Golpira established that the medical group is now
under the control of the Oppressed People's Foundation, even though the
Foundation did not have majority ownership. The Tribunal appeared to
view this in much the same way that a United States court would view
the acquisition of a plurality interest by a new party in the shares of a
corporation. Provided that there has been no overreaching or breach of
duty, the minority shareholder has no remedy. Apparently Golpira was
unable to convince the Tribunal that the situation was not this simple.
The decision can, therefore, be seen either as a retreat to formalism or a
simple application of corporate law.
B. Chamber One Decisions
The second major train of thought relating to the amount of govern-
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ment interference necessary to establish a taking can be seen in two deci-
sions of Chamber One. In Starrett Housing Corp. and The Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran,'46 Chamber One, chaired by Gunnar
Lagergren, issued an Interlocutory Award on the question of whether
there had been a taking of the claimant's investment in Iran. 47 The arbi-
tration dealt with an intricate real estate transaction involving an attempt
to design, build, and market a complex of condominium apartments just
outside of Tehran. 1
48
The project began in the early 1970s when Starrett Housing Corpo-
ration entered into an agreement with Bank Omran, an Iranian develop-
ment bank under the control of the Shah, for the construction of a
portion of the large development. 49 Starrett was to purchase land
through Omran, construct 6000 apartments, and sell those apartments to
Iranian purchasers.' ° The agreement required that Starrett organize a
foreign subsidiary to sign the Project Agreement.' 5 ' Accordingly, Star-
rett created Starrett, S.A., a wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary. 152 Due to
certain restrictions on foreign ownership of property, an Iranian corpora-
tion was created, Shah Goli Apartment Company.'5 3 Starrett owned
79.7 percent of Shah Goli through a German subsidiary. 154 Starrett as-
signed its rights under the Project Agreement to Shah Goli and guaran-
teed Shah Goli's performance.1 55 The Project Agreement required that
Shah Goli, in addition to constructing the apartments, sell them and de-
posit all proceeds in Bank Omran.156 Bank Omran would then deduct
amounts owed under a loan agreement and make the balance available to
Shah Goli.157 Starrett and Shah Goli proceeded to build and sell the
apartments until the time of the Revolution. 58 In late 1978, the appar-
ent danger for United States citizens in Iran caused most of Starrett's 150
supervisors to leave the country, leaving only a handful to run the pro-
ject.1 59 In addition, of the 2000 people who had been working on the
project, only 200 remained.' 61 Strikes and materials shortages brought
146 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 7685 (Jan. 13, 1984).
147 Id.
148 Id.







156 Id. at 7687.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 7696.




work to a virtual halt.161 To a great extent this halt was caused by the
anti-American activities of the revolutionaries. 162
The first overt act aimed at the project occurred in February 1979,
when four men armed with machine guns raided Shah Goli's offices and
informed those present that because the project had been the property of
the Shah prior to the Revolution, it now belonged to the Islamic Repub-
lic. 163 Arthur Radice, the ranking Starrett official, and another Starrett
executive were arrested, but later released. They immediately left the
country. 164
On February 28, 1979, Bank Omran was expropriated by the Ira-
nian government pursuant to efforts to take over all entities that had
formerly been controlled by the Shah.' 65 The change of management
had an immediate affect on the Starrett project. Under the terms of the
Project Agreement, Starrett relied heavily on Omran for certain infra-
structure development, such as the supply of water and electricity to the
project.1 66 Due to Bank Omran's failure to supply this support, Starrett
was unable to deliver apartments to purchasers as promised and there-
fore unable to collect balances due.1 67
In April 1979, Radice returned to Iran in an attempt to salvage
what was left of the project. 68 He was immediately arrested and
charged with an unspecified violation of Iranian law. 169 His passport was
seized to prevent his leaving Iran, but he was released and his passport
returned after a bond had been posted. On release, he once again de-
parted Iran. 170
In July 1979, Shah Goli found itself in a position to deliver some of
the apartments that had been near completion prior to the Revolution
despite Bank Omran's failure to provide services. 171 Shah Goli chose to
invoke the escalation clauses found in the sales contracts, which allowed
a price increase of ten percent to cover increased costs. 172 When told of
the increase, the purchasers informed an officer of the government. The
Revolutionary Guard came to Shah Goli's offices, locked everyone in a
room, turned off the lights, severed all communications, and refused to
161 Id.
162 See id. at 7697-98.
163 Id. at 7697.
164 Id. At this point most United States nationals had already left the country. Starrett's
valiant attempt to retain control over the project should be noted.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 7687.
167 Id. at 7711 (Holtzman, Arb., concurring).
168 Id. at 7687.
169 Id. at 7697. He was later acquitted of the charges.
170 Id. at 7711 (Holtzman, Arb., concurring).
171 Id. at 7697.
172 Id.
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allow anyone to leave until an agreement not to invoke the escalation
clauses was signed.173 This cost Starrett $22 million. 174
July 1979 found Shah Goli in an even more desperate situation.
Bank Omran had blocked its accounts. 175 The blocking deprived Shah
Goli of the ability to meet its obligations or do further work on the pro-
ject. 176 Shah Goli had lost all control over the project, which had essen-
tially passed to Bank Omran. 177
Doggedly determined to save the project, Radice again returned to
Iran, but was forced to leave in September 1979. 17'This left the project in
the hands of an Iranian attorney with no experience in construction. 179
It was hoped that the circumstances would change, allowing Starrett to
return to finish the project.1 80 Unfortunately the seizure of the hostages
at the United States Embassy destroyed any hope for further Starrett
involvement in the project. 8 Immediately following the seizure the last
Starrett official fled Iran.182
Shortly thereafter Iran began taking formal measures affecting the
project. On January 7, 1980, a Bill Concerning Protection of Buyer's
Down-Payments for Incomplete Housing Units was passed.'83 The bill
required that all down payments be deposited in the state housing bank,
which would make payments to the developer based upon progress in
construction. 84
On January 27, 1980, the Revolutionary Council approved a Bill
Concerning the Completion of Construction Works in Housing Cities
and Housing Complexes Which Have Remained Incomplete.1 85 Under
the provisions of the bill, the Ministry of Housing was to locate all unfin-
ished housing projects and prepare a plan for the completion of each
project.186 Although no plan was ever drawn up for the Starrett project,
a Temporary Manager for Shah Goli was appointed three days later pur-
suant to the Bill for Appointing Temporary Manager or Managers for
the Supervision of Manufacturing, Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural





177 Id. at 7713 (Holtzman, Arb., concurring).
178 Id. at 7697.
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The claimant's major contention was that Iran's acts constituted an
expropriation of all of Starrett's rights in the project and that this expro-
priation was achieved through "acts of insurrection. . .[that] prevented
Starrett from completing the project and that the Islamic Republic of
Iran authorized, approved and ratified acts and policies which deprived
Starrett of the effective use, control and benefits of'the project and that
this expropriation was later formalized in governmental decrees that
made no provisions for any compensation."' 188 Thus, the claimant ar-
gued that a taking had occurred long before the appointment of a man-
ager. 189 Iran argued that the appointment of the manager was a
temporary measure and that Iran and Bank Omran had repeatedly re-
quested that Starrett return to finish the project. 9 In addition, Iran as-
serted that the real reason that Starrett had abandoned the project was
that it was near bankruptcy. 191
Gunnar Lagergren pointed out the key issue involved in the case:
It is undisputed in this case that the Government of Iran did not issue
any law or decree according to which the Zomorod Project or Shah
Goli expressly was nationalized or expropriated. However, it is recog-
nized in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere
with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even
though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and the
legal title to property formally remains with the original owner.1 92
Having established the standard to be applied, the Award noted that
by the end of January 1980, Starrett had been deprived "of the effective
use, control and benefits of [its] property rights in Shah Goli" through
the appointment by Iran of a Temporary Manager for Shah Goli. 193 This
appointment deprived the shareholders of the right to manage, use, or
control Shah Goli. 94 The Award further noted that the mere assump-
tion of control of an enterprise by the host state does not always mean
that a compensable taking has occurred. 95 Iran had argued that it had
requested that Starrett return and complete the project, with non-Amefi-
187 Id.
188 Id. at 7689.
189 Id. at 7702.
190 Id. at 7701.
191 Id. Iran claimed that the "Embassy incident was a political issue not related to the social
life and activities of ordinary United States nationals." Id. at 7690.
192 Id. at 7701 (emphasis added).
193 Id. at 7702.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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can managers if necessary.19 6 Lagergren rejected this argument, saying
that the project could not be completed without the participation of a
large number of Americans and that the right to select management, su-
pervisors, and subcontractors is an essential part of the right to manage a
project. 19 7 In addition, Lagergren pointed out that if Starrett did return
to finish the job, it would be subject to the onerous restrictions imposed
by Iranian legislation, including the Ministry of Housing and Bank Mas-
kan's right to manage all such projects. 19 8 The Award noted that Star-
rett would not receive any compensation for any reduction in the value of
the project caused by the interim government managers. 199
The Award also dismissed the claimant's contention that interfer-
ence prior to the appointment amounted to a taking:
There is no reason to doubt that events in Iran prior to January 1980
to which the Claimants refer, seriously hampered their possibilities to
proceed with the construction work and eventually paralyzed the Pro-
ject. But investors in Iran, like investors in all other countries, have to
assume a risk that the country might experience strikes, lock-outs, dis-
turbances, changes of the economic and political system and even
revolution. That any of these risks materialized does not necessarily
mean that property rights affected by such events can be deemed to
have been taken.200
Finding that "[a] revolution as such does not entitle investors to compen-
sation under international law," Lagergren determined that the date of
the taking was January 30, 1980, when Iran appointed the Temporary
Manager .201 Lagergren's opinion correctly noted that the important fac-
tor to be considered in making a taking determination is the impact of
the government action on the investor. 2  The standard suggested by the
opinion is that a taking has occurred when the investor's property rights
have been interfered with to the extent that they are so useless to the
investor that they must be deemed to have been expropriated. This test
seems to be similar to the substantial diminution in value test suggested
earlier: that a taking has occurred when an investor has been deprived of
substantially all value in his investment. Thus, Lagergren's approach to
the problem appears to comport with the preferred community policy
goals outlined earlier.
But the application of this standard appears to have missed the
mark. In refusing to consider as takings acts affecting the Starrett invest-
196 Id. at 7701.








ment prior to the formal appointment of the Temporary Manager, Lager-
gren failed to give proper weight to significant acts adversely affecting the
rights of Starrett. A series of acts by revolutionaries and a revolutionary
government prior to March 1979 had circumvented Starrett's ability to
manage its investment.2 °3 These actions included the creation of an envi-
ronment in which it was unsafe for Americans to remain in the country,
the invasion of the project site by Revolutionary Guards with machine
guns, who arrested Starrett officials and claimed the project for the Is-
lamic Republic, and the nationalization of Bank Omran by the Iranian
government. The bank had been responsible for the supply of various
services under the agreement. By mid-summer 1979, things were even
worse. Starrett officials had been arrested and forced to leave the country
again; Starrett was forced to forego its contractual right to $22 million in
payments; and Starrett's accounts at Bank Omran were blocked. These
acts were ignored by the majority opinion, even though taken together
they would seem to have deprived Starrett of substantially all value in its
investment. In the words of the concurring opinion written by United
States Arbitrator Howard Holtzman,
International case law and commentary are rich with examples of the
circumstances which deprive an owner of use, control or benefit of the
property. These circumstances include: (i) measures which force the
owner to flee the country and thus deprive it of effective management
and control of its property; (ii) measures which deny the owner access
to its funds and profits; (iii) coercion and intimidation forcing the
owner to sell at unfairly low prices; (iv) interference with the owner's
access to needed facilities and supplies; and (v) appointment of conser-
vators and administrators to manage the property in the enforced ab-
sence of the owner. Starrett suffered from each of these circumstances,
caused or ratified by the Government of Iran. 204
Holtzman argued that the Award is based on sterile formalism that has
been found in other decisions of the Tribunal.2 0 5
Thus, the acts prior to the appointment of the Temporary Manager
should have constituted an expropriation. Any argument that these acts
were not the acts of the Iranian government is overly formalistic. The
excessive acts of Iranian revolutionaries were approved, ratified, and
adopted by the Islamic Republic. The International Court of Justice es-
tablished in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Iran 206 that the ratification of the acts of a group of revolution-
203 Id. at 7708.
204 Id.
205 See id. at 7704-05 (Holtzman, Arb., concurring). See also Re Raymond Int'l (U.K.) Ltd., I
Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 394 (1982) (Holtzman, Arb., dissenting) (Arbitrators Aldrich and Mosk
joined Holtzman's dissent).
206 1980 I.C.J. 3.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
aries or militants by a government may constitute a basis for interna-
tional liability for that government. Accordingly, acts prior to January
1980 should have been considered in determining when the taking oc-
curred. The formalistic attitude of the Tribunal could well have a nega-
tive effect on foreign investment. The determination of exactly when a
taking occurred can have a major impact on the amount of compensation
due. Often during a period of social unrest, the value of an investment
can fall at an alarming rate. Waiting for a formal act of the government
can substantially lessen the amount of compensation that will be due to
the foreign investor. This, in turn, could lead to greater hesitance on the
part of investors in entering the international investment sphere, decreas-
ing the likelihood of economic investment.2 °7
Holtzman's critique of the Award appears to be justified. While ar-
ticulating a test for takings that appears to look to the effects of the tak-
ing on the deprived party, the Award bases its decision on the formal acts
of the Iranian government to take control of the ventures in question.
Such an approach elevates form in much the same way as other, much
criticized, taking standards. In Starrett the Tribunal missed an opportu-
nity to reject this formalism in favor of a test that looks to the effect on
the deprived party. Perhaps none of the events prior to the appointment
would alone amount to a taking, but the series of events collectively
should have been more closely analyzed in the Award to determine
whether Starrett had, at some point, lost control over the venture and
been deprived of substantially all value in its investment.
Given its Starrett holding, it is not surprising that Chamber One
looked to the intent of the host state in Sea-Land Service Inc. and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ports and Shipping Organiza-
tion208 which involved the creation of a containerized shipping facility in
Iran by Sea-Land, the claimant.2"9 Sea-Land alleged that in February
1976, it reached an oral agreement with the Iranian Ports and Shipping
Organization (PSO) that allowed Sea-Land to construct and operate the
facility on land provided by PSO and provided that PSO would guaran-
tee Sea-Land's vessels "priority in the provision of tugboats, pilots, cus-
toms, health and immigration clearance."21 Apparently such priority
berthing was necessary in order to make a containerized terminal eco-
207 On the question of valuation, the Tribunal provided no guidance. As this was an interim
order on the merits, the valuation problem was left to a later determination. The Tribunal appointed
an accounting expert to assist in the valuation, but failed to provide a legal standard to be applied in
determining the amount of compensation to be awarded. This will presumably be found in the final
award.
208 No. 135-33-1, slip op. (Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. June 22, 1984).
209 Id. at 2.
210 Id. at 4.
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nomically viable.21' Unfortunately, this agreement was never reduced to
writing.2 12 The only agreement that PSO completed regarding the con-
tainerized facility (Facility Agreement) had been with ILB Container
Company, an Iranian transportation business that had operated as an
agent for numerous cargo handling enterprises.213
PSO admitted that discussions had been held with Sea-Land, but
denied that any agreement had ever been reached.2" 4 Sea-Land argued
that ILB had been its agent and that the Facility Agreement between
PSO and ILB had been entered into by ILB rather than Sea-Land only
because under Iranian law PSO could not grant land for the container
facility to a foreign entity.215 According to Sea-Land, ILB had been re-
tained as its agent in November 1975 and was present at the February
1976 meeting at which PSO orally affirmed the agreement.216 No agency
agreement was signed, however, until April 1977.217 At the time of the
finalization of the agency agreement, a Preferential Use Agreement was
entered into between Sea-Land and ILB, which stated that "the aforesaid
license was procured by ILB Container for the uses and purposes of Sea-
Land Service, Inc." and that the improvements to the site had been car-
ried out by Sea-Land at its own expense.218 In addition, it provided that
"Sea-Land Service should have sole, exclusive and preferential right to
use, occupy and enjoy said land and improvements . ,.219
Construction of the facility was completed in early 1977 and Sea-
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 5. The Facility Agreement provided in part:
The following Agreement has been agreed upon between Port and Shipping Organiza-
tion. . . and I.L.B. Container Company ....
1. The organization agreed to allocate to the Company the parcel of land. . . to be
used for loading, off-loading and storage of the goods imported by the ships represented by
the Company for a maximum period of six years (subject to the provisions of paragraph 5
of this Agreement). ...
2. The Company undertook, at its own cost, to make all necessary preparations for
the use of the said land . ...
5. The Company agreed that in the event that the organization hands over to the
Imperial Navy the existing port facilities prior to the expiration of the term of this Agree-
ment, this Agreement can be terminated by a two-month prior written notice.
6. After the expiration of this Agreement, the Company shall be obligated to remove
from the allocated land all of its movable property. . . and to hand over to the organiza-
tion all immovable facilities ....
Id. at 5-6.
214 Id. at 5.
215 Id. at 6.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 6-7.
218 Id. at 7.
219 Id. at 5.
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Land's ship, the Sea Bridge, stopped regularly.22 ° PSO cooperated by
providing priority berthing.221 The trouble began in September 1978
when PSO failed to provide the necessary priority berthing.2 22 In Febru-
ary 1979, PSO began to limit the types of cargo allowed into the port.2 23
In addition, the local Office of Labor ordered the dismissal of all non-
Iranian employees, prohibited Sea-Land from discharging Iranians, and
ordered Sea-Land to abide by standard wages and terms of employ-
ment. 224 Together these measures slowed the operation of the facility to
such an extent that Sea-Land decided to halt service in November 1979
and closed the project completely the following February.225
Sea-Land presented four contentions to the Tribunal. The first was
that PSO had breached the Facility Agreement between PSO and ILB.226
Sea-Land alleged that it could enforce this agreement because of its posi-
tion as a fully disclosed principal or a third party beneficiary.227 Second
Sea-Land alleged that PSO should be forced to pay compensation for
interference with Sea-Land's lawfully acquired rights to use the port.2 28
Sea-Land's third argument was that because PSO had acquiesced in Sea-
Land's construction and operation of the facility, its later actions effect-
ing the project amounted to a compensable expropriation under interna-
tional law and the Treaty of Amity. 2 9 Finally, Sea-Land claimed that
PSO had been unjustly enriched by its assumption of control over the
project and that Sea-Land should receive restitutionary relief.23 ° Of ma-
jor interest to this study are the second and third claims made by Sea-
Land, but the Tribunal's approach to the contract claim is important in
understanding the outcome on the latter claims.
In deciding the contractual question, the majority opinion of Arbi-
trator Lagergren first found that interpretation of the Facility Agreement
must be governed by Iranian law because "[b]oth parties to it were Ira-
nian, and its subject-matter was a parcel of land in the port of Bandor
Abbas. '' 231 Citing the Civil Code of Iran, the Tribunal noted that there is




224 Id. at 10-11.
225 Id. at 11.
226 Id. at 3.
227 Id. at 8.
228 Id. at 3.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 14. Sea-Land also claimed that monies on deposit at Bank Tejarat were expropriated.
Id. at 25. Despite numerous attempts, the claimant had been unable to convert the account to
dollars. Id. In light of Harza the Tribunal rejected the claim. Id. at 26. The Tribunal also dis-
missed a number of smaller claims and counterclaims involved in the case. See id. at 27-36.
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a presumption that one entering into a transaction does so for himself,
and the burden of proof is on the party trying to prove that the agree-
ment was for the benefit of a third party.232 In addition, the Tribunal
pointed to the fact that under Iranian law, it is illegal for an agent to
undertake activities that are forbidden to his principal.233 Thus, the Tri-
bunal found that Sea-Land had failed to rebut the evidence (the Facility
Agreement) that PSO "intended to grant the actual license to ILB itself
and not to Sea-Land ... *"234 The Tribunal recognized that PSO must
have known of Sea-Land's involvement in the project, but based its rejec-
tion of the agency theory on the fact that "[i]t was clearly not PSO's
intention to enter into contractual relations-at least insofar as the for-
mal allocation of the land was concerned-with Sea-Land, but with an
approved Iranian entity." '235 The Tribunal seems to ignore all of the
facts supporting the conclusion that this was a transaction between PSO
and Sea-Land, with ILB acting as a surrogate to avoid restrictive Iranian
regulations.
Sea-Land's third party beneficiary claim was also rejected by Cham-
ber One.236 Under Iranian law, express mention of such a beneficiary
must be made in the contract.2 37 In any event, the Tribunal felt that Sea-
Land's claims based on priority berthing went far beyond anything men-
tioned in the Facility Agreement.2
38
Having rejected the claimant's contractual arguments, however, the
Tribunal next seemed to recognize that its analysis had been overly rigid:
The Tribunal cautions against any tendency to construe these docu-
ments independently of each other, or without reference to the sur-
232 Id. at 15. This conclusion seems to beg the question. If the Tribunal had found that what
was really involved here was a contract between PSO and Sea-Land, it could have just as easily held
that the contract was internationalized and applied general principles of international law. In any
event, it seems doubtful that the applicable law had a great deal of bearing on the outcome of the
case.
233 Id. Applicable provisions of the Iranian Civil Code provide:
Article 196. Anyone who enters into a transaction does so for himself unless when
entering into the transaction he expressly provides for the contrary, or unless the contrary
is subsequently proved. When entering into a transaction for himself, however, anyone can
make provision for the benefit of a third party.
Article 231. Transactions and contracts are only binding on the two parties con-
cerned or their legal substitutes except in cases coming under Article 196.
See id. The "subsequently proved" language of Article 196 would seem to provide some leeway for
finding that Sea-Land was involved in this transaction. Id. at 14.
234 Id. at 15. Article 662 of the Iranian Civil Code provides: "An attorneyship must not be
given except for a matter which the principle himself is entitle to engage in; and the attorney must be
a person who has the capacity to execute that matter." See Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 16.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 17.
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rounding circumstances . . . . In the view of the Tribunal, this
broader perspective is critical to an understanding of what took place,
and to correct legal characterization of the relationship of the three
protagonists.
Although only a few elements of the project were reduced to clear
contractual form, the Tribunal is satisfied that very much more was
discussed among the three entities concerning the detailed operation of
the proposed container facility, including the need for priority berth-
ing, expedited clearances, and a high level of efficient administrative
co-operation on the part of PSO as an essential prerequisite to the suc-
cessful functioning of a sophisticated transportation system. PSO has
denied that it undertook any contractual obligation in this regard vis-a-
vis Sea-Land. But PSO has not rebutted to the satisfaction of the Tri-
bunal the allegations . . . that consultations had taken place between
itself, ILB and Sea-Land as to the implementation of the project, and
that these discussions had reached an advanced stage. Sea-Land's for-
mal proposal, submitted to PSO by ILB on 8 February 1976 set out in
detail the essential mechanics of the operation of the proposed
container facility and was clearly itself the product of a highly devel-
oped course of negotiations. The proposal envisaged that Sea-Land
would construct and operate the facility at its expense and in collabo-
ration with ILB, and PSO would guarantee certain operational assist-
ance, including priority berthing. There is no question that PSO was
fully apprised of Sea-Land's involvement and was prepared to accept
the scheme, subject only to any objections the Iranian Navy might
raise in connection with its adjacent installations. Indeed, Sea-Land is
mentioned by name in the correspondence in this connection between
PSO and the Naval Commander.
Sea-Land has not, however, been able to satisfy the Tribunal that
this broad, underlying understanding between itself and PSO ever crys-
tallized into a sufficiently precise formulation to constitute an enforcea-
ble contract obliging PSO to perform certain functions for the express
benefit of Sea-Land. The conclusion might have been otherwise if ac-
ceptance of the specific terms of Sea-Land's proposal by PSO or the
Ministry of Roads and Transportation had been proven. In the ab-
sence of such proof, the Tribunal is left with a proposal, albeit a de-
tailed one, evidently accepted in principle but never reduced to a clear
contractual formula. Apart from the limited aspects covered by the
Facility Agreement itself, the rest of the "arrangement" appears to
have proceeded on the basis of the good faith of the parties.'V9
Sea-Land's second claim was that PSO should be forced to pay dam-
ages for having "violated lawfully acquired rights to use the Bandar Ab-
bas and Tehran facilities."24 0 The Tribunal rejected this argument
because it felt that in the absence of a contract, it was difficult to identify
239 Id. at 17-19.
240 Id. at 19.
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an "acquired right."24 '
The Tribunal also rejected the expropriation claim.24 2 Sea-Land
had alleged that an expropriation occurred because PSO interfered with
its operation of the container facility.24 3 In order for the system to work,
a finely tuned procedure for berthing had to be followed. 2" In Septem-
ber, 1978, the system began to break down.2 45 The necessary clearances
could not be obtained, and berthing was often delayed.24 6 Sea-Land's
worldwide services were affected.247 The Tribunal admitted that Sea-
Land's difficulties were caused by the inability of PSO to properly man-
age the port.248 There were no acts of discrimination against Sea-Land,
however. 249 It was Sea-Land's form of doing business that left it in a
vulnerable position.250  In addition, Sea-Land claimed that restrictions
on the types of cargo that could be unloaded interfered with the opera-
tion to such an extent that an expropriation occurred.251 The Tribunal
rejected this argument, stating that such measures are reasonable in a
time of social upheaval:
In the Tribunal's view, all this tends to indicate a state of upheaval in
PSO's internal management which is consistent with the general pic-
ture of disruption which characterized Iran in the months leading up
to the success of the Revolution. It does not suggest that PSO had
241 Id. at 20. In support of this contention, the Tribunal cited 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 764 (2d ed. 1970) and the Oscar Chinn case, [1934] P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B No. 63, 88. Sea-
Land, No. 135-33-1, slip op. at 20 nn. 4, 5. The Tribunal gave this issue too little consideration. The
notion of acquired rights espoused by the Tribunal fails to recognize that the requirement of some
sort of vested property right is likely to leave many forms of foreign investment unprotected by the
international minimum standard. This could serve to discourage the use of innovative forms of
foreign investment that do not appear to comport with traditional vested property notions, resulting
in slowed world economic development. In this case a determination that PSO had interfered with
Sea-Land's contractual relationship with ILP might have been appropriate. Another approach that
might have been addressed is whether Sea-Land obtained rights due to a course of dealings with
PSO. The Tribunal's failure to address these issues because of its adherence to the traditional vested
property rights approach is unfortunate.
242 Sea-Land, No. 135-33-1, slip op. at 21.
243 Id. Sea-Land contended that the Treaty of Amity "sets a particularly high standard for
protection of the property of enterprises of foreign nationals." Id. at 26. The Tribunal rejected this
assertion, stating that "[t]here is nothing in either Article II or Article IV of the Treaty which
extends the scope of either States's international responsibility beyond those categories of acts al-
ready recognized by international law as giving rise to liability for a taking." Id. In light of the




247 Id. at 21-22.
248 Id. at 22.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 23.
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embarked upon a policy of deliberate disruption or non-co-operation
directed at Sea-Land in particular.252
The Tribunal also rejected the contention that labor regulations in-
terfered with the right to manage the project and amounted to an expro-
priation." 3 It said that the acts complained of had all occurred during
the Revolution, and that those acts could not fairly be attributed to the
government that eventually came to power.2 54
In addressing the taking issue the Tribunal noted:
A finding of expropriation would require, at the very least, that the
Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate governmental interfer-
ence with the conduct of Sea-Land's operation, the effect of which was to
deprive Sea-Land and of the use and benefit of its investment. Nothing
has been demonstrated here that might have amounted to an inten-
tional course of conduct directed against Sea-Land. A claim founded
substantially on omissions and inaction in a situation where the evi-
dence suggests a widespread and indiscriminate deterioration in man-
agement, disrupting the functioning of the port of Bandar Abbas, can
hardly justify a finding of expropriation.
Thus the claim against the Government of Iran based on expro-
priation must be dismissed.255
The decision that no taking had occurred was correct. The deterio-
ration of services and interference in the operation of the facility might
have amounted to a breach of contract had such a contract existed, but it
is going too far to call this a taking. The failure to provide berthing
services cannot be seen as a deprivation of substantially all value of Sea-
Land's investment. Sea-Land's operation was vulnerable to disorder in
the host state, but the host state cannot be considered a guarantor for
vulnerable operations. Assuming that there was no contract here, the
government's failure to provide special services should not constitute an
expropriation.
What about Sea-Land's claim that the customs and labor regula-
tions amounted to such an expropriation? Although this argument
might have been accepted under Revere's effective control test, the Tribu-
nal correctly rejected it here. The regulations were certainly within the
scope of desired host-state competence. This is particularly true in light
of the state of disorder in Iran during this period. In addition there is no
indication that these regulations deprived the investor of substantially all
value in his investment.
Sea-Land's last argument was that PSO had been unjustly enriched
252 Id. at 22.
253 Id. at 24.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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by its actions and that it should be forced to compensate Sea-Land for
that enrichment.256 The Tribunal noted that unjust enrichment is a prin-
ciple that has been widely accepted in municipal legal systems and ap-
plied by international tribunals:
The rule against unjust enrichment is inherently flexible as its underly-
ing rationale is "to re-establish a balance between two individuals, one
of whom has enriched himself with no cause, at the other's expense."
Its equitable foundation "makes it necessary to take into account all
the circumstances of each specific situation." It involves a duty to
compensate which is entirely reconcilable with the absence of any in-
herent unlawfulness of the acts in question. Thus the principle finds an
obvious field of application in cases where a foreign investor has sus-
tained a loss whereby another party has been enriched, but which does
not arise out of an internationally unlawful act which would found a
claim for damages.
There are several instances of recourse to the principle of unjust en-
richment before international tribunals. There must have been an en-
richment of one party to the detriment of the other, and both must
arise as a consequence of the same act or event. There must be no
justification for the enrichment, and no contractual or other remedy
available to the injured party whereby he might seek compensation
from the party enriched.
2 57
Reviewing the record, the Tribunal determined that PSO had made ac-
tive use of the facility and awarded $750,000 in compensation. 8
Chamber One's analysis of the taking standard is based upon a solid
foundation, but is flawed in one major area. As a foundation for his
taking theory, Arbitrator Lagergren found that a taking has occurred
when actions taken by the state "interfere with property rights to such an
extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed
to have been expropriated. 25 9 Although somewhat circular in logic, the
standard suggested in Lagergren's opinions seems to be identical to the
substantial diminution in value test outlined above. In doing that it ap-
pears to comport well with preferred community policy goals. It pro-
256 Id. at 27.
257 Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted). In determining the amount of damages to award, the Tribu-
nal looked to "the level of investment; the period during which the foreign investor has been able to
make a profit; and the benefit actually derived by the host country from the acquisition." Id. at 29.
The Tribunal noted that PSO had a long term interest in the project in that it was to revert to PSO
after six years. Id. It also pointed out that Sea-Land had been willing to invest approximately $3
million dollars in the project. Id. Following Sea-Land's desertion of the project, PSO had possession
of it for three years and four months prior to the date provided in the agreement. Id. at 30. The
Tribunal rejected Sea-Land's claim that it should receive compensation under this theory for lost
profits of $6.4 million, stating that the appropriate level of compensation looks to the extent to which
PSO was enriched. Id.
258 Id. at 32.
259 Starrett, Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. at 7701.
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vides adequate competence to the host state authorities by providing a
great deal of latitude before a taking will be found. At the same time the
investor is assured that his property rights will not be rendered totally
useless. This should serve to encourage international investment. Fi-
nally, because this standard is relatively clear, disputes regarding meas-
ures affecting property should be lessened.
Chamber One's reasoning is flawed, however, in one major respect.
The Starrett and Sea-Land opinions have applied the test in an overly
formalistic manner that ignores preferred community policy goals. In
Starrett, despite numerous informal acts that should have amounted to a
taking under the general rule laid out by Lagergren, Chamber One chose
to base its taking finding on an official government act. Refusing to rec-
ognize that other, less formal, acts could constitute the basis for a taking
does not reflect the goals of a preferred community policy. Although
providing for adequate, even excessive, host state competence, the Cham-
ber One standard as applied does little to assist in the furtherance of
peaceful settlements and economic growth. Any taking regime must take
into account informal acts if it is going to be effective in preventing con-
flict between wealth exporting and importing nations. In addition, an
investor will not be assured by a rule that appears to be applicable only in
cases involving a governmental decree.
This formalism can also be seen in the Sea-Land case. There Lager-
gren adds an intent element to the taking test. The host state must have
deliberately taken an action that renders the investment worthless. Inci-
dental effects caused by government action will apparently not be consid-
ered takings. This further removes Chamber One from our preferred
community policy goals. Investors are not concerned with whether their
investment has become valueless due to an act aimed directly at the in-
vestment or one that has the incidental effect of destroying value of the
investment. If the goal is to encourage development, incidental takings
must be considered. Indeed, it may be the incidental takings that are
most likely to cause loss to a wealth exporter.
Although Chamber One's general taking standard is closer to the
substantial diminution in value test, and thus preferred community pol-
icy goals, than the standard outline by Chamber Two, the formalism ex-
hibited in its application in these two cases prevent the decisions from
becoming major stepping stones in the development of international law
that reflects preferred community policy goals.
C. Chamber Three Decisions
The decisions of Chamber Three relating to the taking of foreign
investments are the least satisfying of those issued by the Tribunal to
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date. In Schering Corporation v. the Islamic Republic of Iran,260 Cham-
ber Three rejected the claimant's assertion that Iran was responsible for
the expropriation of the claimant's property by a "Workers' Council."
Claimant Schering is a United States corporation involved in the manu-
facture and marketing of pharmaceutical products worldwide.26'
Through a complex series of subsidiaries, Schering wholly-owned an Ira-
nian Corporation, Schering Corporation (Iran) Ltd. (Schering-Iran).262
Schering-Iran was created to trade in Schering pharmaceuticals in
Iran.263 An Iranian corporation named Firooz purchased goods from
Schering-Iran for distribution in Iran.264 Royalties from the sales were
paid by Schering-Iran to Schering under a Trademark Licensing Agree-
ment, and dividends were paid in foreign exchange.265 There was also an
outstanding indebtedness of Schering-Iran to a Schering subsidiary of
$1.1 million.2 6 6 After the Revolution, Workers' Councils were created in
Iranian businesses and manufacturing plants, and Schering-Iran was no
exception.267 In January 1980, the Workers' Council at Schering-Iran
took control of the enterprise. 268 At this point Schering-Iran ceased pay-
ing royalties on its sales and making loan payments.269
Before the Tribunal, Schering presented three claims. The first
claim was for the payment of debts owned by Schering-Iran to Schering
and its affiliates in the amount of approximately $19 million.270 Schering
argued that the Bank Markazi imposed unlawful exchange restrictions
and refused to honor drafts; and the Workers' Council at Schering had
never paid approximately $16 million for sales of pharmaceuticals to
Schering-Iran; $238,297 in past due royalties; $69,000 in dividends; and
$1,854,328.83 for principal and interest on the loan.271 Schering charged
that the failure to honor these claims was in violation of Iranian law, the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the
United States of America and Iran dated August 15, 1955, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Agreement, and general principles of international
law.2
72
Schering's second argument was that the Workers' Council, and










270 Id. at 8327.
271 Id at 8326.
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thus Iran, had expropriated $1,135,154.30 from Schering-Iran.273 Fi-
nally, the claimant charged that the Foundation for the Oppressed had
taken control of Firooz, and refused to pay the $5,367,000 that it owed
Schering-Iran.2 74 The claimant alleged that the Foundation for the Op-
pressed was an instrumentality of the Iranian government and that the
government was responsible for its actions.275
Under the first claim, it was established that Bank Markazi had or-
dered the Foreign Trade Bank not to honor Schering drafts amounting to
approximately $400,000.276 Finding no legitimate reason for the decision
to refuse payment, the Tribunal decided for the claimant.2 77 Claimant's
assertion, that an additional $1.2 million in drafts were refused, was re-
jected because of insufficient evidence. 78 The Tribunal failed to consider
the claimant's contention that certain exchange restrictions were in viola-
tion of international law and the Treaty of Amity.2 79 Arbitrator Mosk,
however, felt that the exchange restrictions could have constituted a tak-
ing under international law.280  According to Mosk, in determining
whether a taking had occurred, factors such as whether the restrictions
are non-discriminatory, whether they are justified on bona fide economic
grounds, and whether the restrictions serve to extinguish the investor's
enjoyment and use of his currency should be considered.28' The dissent
criticized the majority for failing to consider whether such a compensa-
ble taking had occurred, but concluded that, in any event, the restrictions
are contrary to the Treaty of Amity because Iran had failed to justify
their existence and in violation of the International Monetary Fund
Agreement because prior approval had not been obtained for these addi-
tional restrictions.282
273 Id. The Tribunal chose to decide the case on the merits rather than decide the jurisdic-
tional issues. Id. at 8327. One of the issues involved the effect of an alleged assignment on jurisdic-
tion under the Claims Settlement Declaration. Id. One of the claims was based in part on a claim of
Schering-Puerto Rico, which had apparently assigned its right to bring the action to Schering-U.S.
Id. Iran claimed that the cause of action had not been continuously owned by the United States
National from the date on which the claim arose to Jan. 19, 1981, as required by the Claims Settle-
ment Declaration, arL VII, para. 2. Id. Iran also claimed that the third claim involved a claim by
an Iranian corporation (Sehering-Iran) against its own government and that the Tribunal lacked
jurisdiction to hear such claims. Id.
274 Id. at 8326.
275 Id. at 8329.
276 Id. at 8328.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 8328-29. This apparent lack of evidence was assailed by Mosk, the United States
arbitrator, as error due to substantial evidence establishing that drafts had been presented for pay-
ment. Id. at 8333 (Mosk, Arb., dissenting).
279 See id.
280 Id. at 8337.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 8338.
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The first claim also involved allegations that the Workers' Council
had acted to prevent payment of debts due to Schering by Schering-Iran.
Schering argued that the Schering-Iran Workers' Council had used du-
ress in obtaining an agreement from the Schering-Iran Manager. That
agreement required that Schering-Iran's cash be used "to purchase chem-
icals and finished products from affiliated companies of Schering-Iran;
and that payments to those affiliated companies for merchandise payables
existing on 31 December 1979 would be subject to, among others, com-
pletion of such purchase of chemicals and finished products." '283 Thus,
because of actions by the Workers' Council, Schering and its affiliates
were not paid amounts owing and were thus deprived of their property
and contractual rights.
The claimant alleged that Iran was responsible for the action of the
Workers' Council because the Council is an arm of the Iranian Govern-
ment.284 In determining whether the Workers' Councils are instrumen-
talities of the Iranian government, the Tribunal first looked to Principle
104 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which reads:
In order to safeguard Islamic justice in the preparation of programs,
and in the coordination of progress in the affairs of industrial and agri-
cultural production units, councils composed of representatives of
workers, farmers, and other employees and managers will be organized
to operate in educational, administrative, and service units. These
councils will thus be comprised of representatives of the members of
these units. The manner of organizing these councils and the limits of
their duties and privileges shall be prescribed by law.28
Further, the Rules for the Formation of Workers' Councils approved by
the Council of Ministers of Iran in October 1979 provided:
The Islamic Republic of Iran does not consider the Workers' Council
of any institution and the management thereof, as separate from each
other, and believes that the interests of the workers are common to the
interests of the institution and the interests of the institution are com-
mon to the interests of the country and the people, and recommends
the following rules for the formation of the councils. These councils
are functioning within the framework of the laws of the country and
the relevant regulations.2 86
The Tribunal concluded that the councils' only duties are to represent
the interests of the workers in dealing with management. 87 In likening
283 Id. at 8329.
284 Ia
285 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONST. principle 104, quoted in Iranian Assets Litigation
Rep. at 8329.
286 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONST. preamble, quoted in Iranian Assets Lit. Rep. at 8329-
30.
287 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. at 8330.
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the councils to labor unions, the Tribunal found that the Workers' Coun-
cil was not acting on behalf of Iran:
Furthermore, regardless of what has now been said there is no evi-
dence in this case that the Workers' Council in fact acted on behalf of
the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or entities, that there
was any government influence over the election of the members of the
Council, that any governmental orders, directives or recommendations
were issued to the Council or that it acted under instructions of any
governmental body.288
Although persuasive on the surface, the Tribunal's opinion overlooks a
number of facts that are brought out in the dissenting opinion of United
States arbitrator Mosk. Mosk felt that Iran had failed to produce evi-
dence regarding the relationship between the Workers' Councils and
Iran, making it difficult to determine the exact role of the Councils. 289 In
addition to the information relied on by the majority, Mosk pointed to
the Legal Bill Establishing Islamic Workers' Councils for Manufactur-
ing, Industrial, Agricultural, and Service Units of June 1980, which pro-
vided that the purpose of the Workers' Councils is to "buttress the
foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran" and to "increase the peo-
ple's sense of their duty to safeguard and defend the Revolution
.... ,29 In addition, Mosk looked to the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs' responsibility for holding the elections of the Workers' Councils
and to the existence of regional supervisory boards, which have as their
presidents government representatives. 29 1 In concluding that the Work-
ers' Councils were far more than "private labor organizations subject to
government regulation," Mosk noted that the Iranian law "required the
formation of Workers' Councils, dealt with their internal operation and
specified that they serve more than the interests of the workers." '292 In-
deed, in this case, the Workers' Council had based its actions on the
assertion that Schering-Iran "and its foreign partners" had "selfish, im-
288 Id. (footnote omitted).
289 Id.
290 Id. at 8336.
291 Id. Mosk further pointed out that
[t]he Office of Employment determines where such boards are to be convened. Article
13 provides that "[i]n order to establish supervisory boards for council affairs, regulate
their programs and oversee their activities, as well as to provide the necessary coordina-
tion, a bureau to be known as the 'coordination bureau over the supervisory boards for
council affairs' will be created within the Ministry of Labor and Social Labor and Social
Affairs." Article 16 provides that the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible
for insuring that the laws concerning the Workers' Councils "are properly implemented."
Subsequent laws were enacted concerning the formation and operation of the Workers'
Councils.
292 Id. at 8336-37.
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perialist motives" and an intent "to gain higher profits and plunder the
Iranian people."'2 93 Finally, Mosk pointed to the memorandum from the
Workers' Council to Schering-Iran stating that the Council was "respon-
sible to [the] Iran revolutionary government and people." '294 Concluding
that the Tribunal had erred in failing to discuss adequately these issues,
Mosk asserted that Iran's failure to provide evidence on the issue should
have led to the conclusion that the Workers' Councils were state
entities.29"
In view of its finding that the Workers' Council was not an agency
or instrumentality of the state, the Tribunal refused to hold that Iran was
responsible for the acts alleged in claim one or two.2 96 Thus, the expro-
priation claim was dismissed.297
The final claim, based on a debt allegedly owed by Firooz to Scher-
ing-Iran, was dismissed because it was not an outstanding claim as of
January 9, 1981, as required by the Claims Settlement Agreement.298
The major question of interest in this case is whether Iran should be
required to pay compensation for the acts of its Workers' Council. The
Tribunal seemed to be of the opinion that an entity such as the Workers'
Council is either a private labor union or a government agency of the
traditional type. The lack of inquiry into the actual functions of the en-
tity reflects the failure to assess the reality of the situation. Arbitrator
Mosk correctly noted that there was sufficient evidence to establish that
this entity was more than a traditional labor union, and Iran should have
been forced to establish otherwise. The Tribunal's failure to hold is an-
other example of the rigidity that has marked a number of its opinions.
On December 19, 1983, Nils Mangard, the Chairman of Chamber
Three, issued an Award in American International Group, Inc. and Is-
lamic Republic of Iran.2 99 Richard Mosk, the United States arbitrator,
filed an opinion concurring in the result,30 0 but the Iranian arbitrator,
Parviz Ansari Moin, refused to sign the Award.30 1
The claim arose from the nationalization of an Iranian insurance
company, Iran America, in which the claimant held an equity interest,
pursuant to the Law of Nationalization of Insurance Companies.30 2 The
293 Id. at 8337 n.5.
294 Id. at 8337.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 8330.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 8332. Schering-Iran had apparently granted Firooz an extension beyond this date.
Id. at 8331.
299 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 7744 (1984).
300 Id. at 7752.
301 Id. at 7751.
302 Id. at 7744-45.
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company was subsequently managed by a director chosen by a govern-
mental board, and the assets of the company were later transferred to
Asia Iran Insurance Company.3"3 The claimants alleged that the nation-
alization was in violation of international law and that prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation must be provided under the principles of cus-
tomary international law and the provisions of the Treaty of Amity. 3"
They also alleged that actions preceding the formal nationalization
amounted to an expropriation of the company.3 °5
In addition to several technical arguments,306 Iran argued that the
Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because a nationalization is
not an expropriation under international law and the Tribunal is limited
to hearing cases dealing with expropriation.30 7 Substantively the Irani-
ans adopted the position of the developing nations. Iran felt that it had
not violated international law in nationalizing Iran America because na-
tionalization is universally recognized "as an expression of the perma-
nent sovereignty which every nation enjoys over national resources and
economic activities within its territory."308 While Iran recognized that
there was a duty to compensate, it argued that international law does not
require that the compensation be paid promptly, only that the nationaliz-
ing state indicate promptly that compensation will be paid "within a rea-
sonable time."30 9 Iran also took the position that the Treaty of Amity
was no longer in force and that, even if it were, no "taking," as defined in
the Treaty, had occurred.310
The Award dismissed Iran's claim that the Tribunal lacked jurisdic-
tion because Iran's actions constituted nationalizations rather than ex-
propriations.311 The Tribunal felt that the term "expropriation" includes
nationalizations as well as other forms of taking.312 Even if it does not,
the Tribunal reasoned that the Declaration grants jurisdiction over
"other measures affecting property rights," providing an adequate basis
for jurisdiction in this case.313
303 Id. at 7745.
304 Id. at 7747.
305 Id. at 7745 n.2.
306 See id. at 7745.
307 Id. Iran also argued that the Iranian Commercial Code gives domestic courts exclusive
jurisdiction over domestic corporations, "that the Claimant has failed to exhaust local remedies
provided in the Iranian law and that the nationalization of insurance companies was an Act of State
which is not subject to review by an international tribunal." Id. Although the Tribunal did not
directly discuss these claims, its decision indicates that they must have been rejected.
308 Id. at 7747.
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On the merits, the Award stated that the nationalizations were not
illegal under customary international law or the Treaty of Amity because
they were undertaken for a public purpose and were not discrimina-
tory.3 14 Without discussion, the Tribunal concluded that even though
lawful, a nationalization must be compensated.315 Since no compensa-
tion had been paid, the Tribunal reasoned that Iran is now obligated to
pay damages. 16 The remainder of the Award focused on determining
the amount of compensation due. The Tribunal found that "the valua-
tion should be made on the basis of the fair market value of the shares in
Iran America at the date of nationalization. 317
In setting the date of the taking, the Award looked to the time of the
formal nationalization of the company pursuant to Iranian law. There is
no discussion of whether government acts or acts attributable to the gov-
ernment might have constituted a taking prior to this date.
The Schering and American Int'l Group cases are disappointing in
that they do little to address the issue of what measure of host state inter-
ference constitutes a taking under international law. There is no evi-
dence of any attempt in either of these cases to come up with a working
definition of a taking, despite arguments by the claimants that Chamber
Three should reject formalistic notions of what constitutes a taking.
Consequently, the cases do little to assist in the development of an inter-
national minimum standard that comports with preferred community
policy goals.
V. CONCLUSION
Do the taking decisions of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal provide a
basis for the further development of international law in light of pre-
ferred community policy goals? The opinions provide a basis for both
optimism and pessimism. The basic standard set out in Arbitrator
Lagergren's opinions defines a taking as an interference with property
that renders that property so useless that it must be considered to have
been expropriated. This seems to be identical to the substantial diminu-
tion in value standard. Such a construction of the taking standard com-
ports with preferred community policy goals. It provides the host state
with adequate competence to rule effectively by requiring that state inter-
ference reach a very high level before a taking will be found. It provides
investors with much needed protection from acts that destroy the value
of their investments. This should help to encourage additional invest-
ment and development. Finally, it provides a relatively certain basis on
314 Id. at 7748.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 7749.
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which taking determinations may be based, which should reduce the like-
lihood of a resort to coercive measures.
Chamber Two's basic standard is less sound. By pointing to the
deprivation of fundamental rights as the taking, Chamber Two is adding
to the confusion surrounding this issue. Determining what constitutes a
fundamental right is very difficult. Depending on the orientation of the
decisionmaker, a fundamental right may be seen as some minor stick in
the bundle of property rights or as something much more important.
This approach fails to adequately provide for host state competence. If a
host state action affecting one "fundamental right" can amount to a tak-
ing, even when the owner is not deprived of substantially all value in his
investment, the ability of the host state to regulate will be curtailed. In
addition, the difficulty in defining a fundamental right makes it likely
that disputes will arise over what constitutes such a right.
Chamber Three's decisions, which fail even to attempt to create a
taking standard, are the least satisfying. A case-by-case analysis without
any attempt to define the threshold level for a taking does little to ad-
vance preferred community policy goals. Such short-sighted analysis
tells us nothing about what the court is doing or what parties may expect
in the future.
One element that can be found in all of these opinions, with the
possible exception of those from Chamber Two, is a propensity to look to
formal acts rather than informal acts in reaching conclusions. This re-
sort to formalism can most easily be seen in the Starret, Sea-Land, and
Schering cases. While adopting a standard that seems to reject tradi-
tional formalistic views, the Tribunal proceeded to decide cases based on
formal measures such as the appointment of managers. Chamber One's
requirement that the investment be rendered useless by an intentional act
of the host state aimed at the foreign investment is also troubling. For-
eign investment is harmed just as much by incidental effects and informal
acts as by those that are intended. Perhaps the Tribunal's failure fully to
apply its own basic standards reflects the difficult internal political situa-
tion on the Tribunal. Made up of one-third Iranians, one-third Ameri-
cans, and one-third neutrals, it has not been easy to develop any sort of
working consensus. This can be seen in the comments of Arbitrator
Shafeiei in his TAMS-AFFA dissent:
[W]e Iranian arbitrators have written that this Tribunal, as now consti-
tuted, is in no sense impartial and is not competent to adjudicate the
disputes of a Third World country with the United States. I perceived
this clear and overt lack of impartiality in the adjudication of the pres-
ent case. Mr. Riphagen ignored all the rules of law and even the most
elementary technical and accounting rules. At a certain stage of our
study and deliberations, it became thoroughly clear to me that Mr.
Riphagen's aim is to transfer millions of dollars to the United States
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from Iran's security account. Therefore, all my efforts in analyzing the
legal, technical, and accounting issues, and even my efforts to arrive at
least at a more or less equitable solution, have been to no avail.
Because I am entirely convinced that the deliberations and adjudica-
tion in connection with the present case were neither just nor impar-
tial, and that the transfer of these millions of dollars to the United
States from the account of the Iranian nation is taking place in an
illegal and illegitimate manner, I have refused to sign the present
award. Should the "award" be automatically enforced, depriving
thereby the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of its rights to
a meaningful defence and legitimate objections, then what has taken
place as "international arbitration" cannot, in my view, be regarded as
anything but a clear instance of misappropriation of the national assets
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.31s
Given the history of United States interference in Iranian affairs, it is
understandable that there should be some bitterness on the part of the
Iranian government towards the United States. This has been reflected
in the failure to normalize the relationship between the United States and
Iran. There may even be pressure from the home front on the Iranian
arbitrators to take a hard line in the Tribunal's deliberations. The attack
on the Swedish arbitrator by two Iranian arbitrators may merely be a
symptom of these problems.319 There may also be some concern that the
Iranians will desert the arbitration process completely and refuse to pro-
vide additional funds for the security fund. These factors may be respon-
sible for the formalistic attitude that has been found in Tribunal decisions
to date. It seems easier to justify a decision when it can be based on
formal acts or agreements rather than on informal acts. Concern over
Iranian participation may be fueling the fires of formalism. It will be
interesting to watch the Tribunal as it progresses with two new Iranian
arbitrators.32° Will the formalism persist?
What do these cases portend for the future? Several things have
been clearly established by the Tribunal. First, the developing nations
argument that there may be no duty to provide compensation was clearly
rejected in these cases. When a taking has occurred, compensation will
be required. The cases also fail to lend any credence to the argument
that compensation should not be required because of American economic
or political imperialism.
The cases also establish that a taking can occur without a physical
confiscation of a foreign investment. For the most part the economic
impact on the investor will be the main consideration. A taking will be
318 No. 141-7-2, slip op. at 46 (Shafeiei, Arb., dissenting).
319 See supra note 18 for a description of the event.
320 Id.
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found when an investor is deprived of fundamental rights of ownership
or his property has become useless. These are all positive developments
when considered in light of preferred community policy goals. The Tri-
bunal's decisions have missed the mark, however, due to the formalistic
application of the taking standard and an inability to define a precise
notion of a "fundamental right." It is unfortunate that the Tribunal did
not look at each case to determine at what point the investor was de-
prived of substantially all value in his investment. Such a test necessarily
rejects formalism and comports with all of the preferred community pol-
icy goals. It serves to protect investors against measures affecting their
property rights. It also provides a definite standard that is likely to lessen
the use of coercion. The host state will know that it has flexibility in
creating policies to encourage economic and social growth. This test bal-
ances all of the preferred community policy goals and provides an appro-
priate standard for the international community. Given the importance
that this Tribunal will play in the development of international law, it
will be interesting to see if its future holdings address the shortcomings of
these cases.
